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Abstract 
Over ten years ago, major changes in the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
technology led to its explosion in popularity. GPS devices are now 
ubiquitous, escorting their users everywhere they go, and potentially 
recording the entirety of their whereabouts. As such, they represent 
invaluable assets to forensic practitioners. Amongst the different brands, 
Garmin and Tom-Tom are by far the most widespread, and are regularly 
encountered as part of investigations.  
GPS forensics is a relatively new field of study, in which tools and 
methodologies are very reliant upon the device itself. Whereas several tools 
and methodologies have been developed to address Tom-Tom devices, the 
lack of knowledge concerning Garmin devices may lead to investigators 
missing evidence. 
This thesis aims to explore forensic methods applicable to Garmin devices, 
and highlight locational artefacts located on them, which may be of use in a 
digital investigation. To do so, three series of experiments have been 
designed and performed, intending to document the behaviour of the 
device, the methods to acquire and analyse its content efficiently, and the 
reliability of the data recovered. 
This thesis shows successful acquisition of data from a range of Garmin 
devices. It also demonstrates that various forensic artefacts can be 
recovered from Garmin devices, with the results compared to similar 
research into Tom-Tom GPS devices. This highlights that Garmin devices 
potentially have a greater forensic potential than Tom-Tom devices, as it 
was found they typically hold up to 6 month of their user’s daily locations, 
regardless of whether the navigation was in use or not. Using carving 
techniques and file signatures discovered through the project, this thesis 
shows how to recover further location tracking data from unallocated 
clusters. However, it also highlights that such information should be 
considered carefully, since the work also demonstrates that the data can be 
manipulated using anti-forensic techniques. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Context 
In the early morning of May 2nd, 2000, a silent but huge step was taken 
concerning the Global Positioning System (GPS). “Every civilian GPS 
receiver around the globe went from errors the size of a football field to 
errors the size of small room” (Humphreys, 2012). This change led the 
explosion of GPS devices in popularity. As GPS chips become smaller and 
cheaper, they are used for an ever-growing number of applications (For 
instance running, navigation systems, or smartphones), making them 
almost ubiquitous in today’s world. Because of their popularity, they provide 
a further potential source of data for forensic investigators.  
Locational artefacts are of great value to investigators, as they can place a 
suspect on a crime scene within and timeframe (Ball, 2008), or be used for 
digital profiling and build the behavioural profile of a suspect based on his 
whereabouts (C. M. Colombini, Colella, Castiglione, & Scognamiglio, 2012). 
However, along with the variety of embedded devices comes different 
technologies, needing appropriate forensic techniques to be investigated (S. 
L. Garfinkel, 2010). 
So far, researchers have published papers on how to forensically investigate 
GPS devices, but it either addresses GPS broadly (Cusack & Simms, 2011; 
Last, 2009; Strawn, 2009) or focuses on only TomTom devices (C. 
Colombini, 2009; Hannay, 2008; Nutter, 2008; van Eijk & Roeloffs, 2010). 
Despite having an important part of the GPS market share, Garmin has 
received little attention from the forensic research community. 
This lack of documentation induces a lack of knowledge regarding Garmin 
devices, which may lead to evidence being routinely missed (S. L. Garfinkel, 
2010). To help forensic analysts better handle those devices and being able 
to retrieve the essential information quickly, it is important to explore 
Garmin GPS forensics, to document where to find such information, and 
which methods may be used to access it. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
Tom-tom and Garmin are the current global leaders for GPS devices 
(cargpsrating.com, 2014). Whilst Tom-tom has been the subject of 
numerous studies, few investigations on Garmin GPS devices have been 
documented (Jones, Sutherland, & Tryfonas, 2008). Regardless of the 
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brand, forensic investigators must understand what data can be recovered, 
and how they could be recovered without damaging the physical nor the 
logical integrity of the device (Carrier, 2005). As the data is likely to be used 
in front of a court of law, it is therefore paramount to assess its reliability, 
and whether or not it could have been modified in any way that the 
investigator would not be able to detect (Lallie & Benford, 2011; Strawn, 
2009). 
This project aims to explore forensic methods applicable to Garmin devices, 
and document locational artefacts located on them. To support it, four 
objectives have been defined: 
1. From the literature, review the principles and limitations of the 
Global Positioning System, and how this technology is used 
nowadays. Investigate how GPS forensic investigations are 
performed, regarding to a specific brand such as Tom-Tom or 
Garmin. 
2. Based on the findings of the literature review, design a set of 
experiments aiming to assess forensic acquisition and analysis of 
Garmin systems, and challenge the reliability of the evidence 
retrieved.  
3. Implement the experiments and document the main steps in order to 
make them reproducible. Collect the raw results. 
4. Discuss and evaluate the results, by comparing them to similar 
studies conducted by the community. 
1.3 Thesis layout 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The remaining is organized as 
follows: 
 Chapter 2 - Literature review: This chapter presents the overall 
principles of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). It also 
reviews the studies conducted on GPS forensics, anti-forensics, and 
Garmin forensics. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader a 
background understanding, and present the state of the art regarding 
geo-forensics. 
 Chapter 3 - Experimental design: This chapter divides the 
objectives of this thesis into Research Questions, and designs a set of 
experiments aiming to address them. 
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 Chapter 4 - Experimentation: This chapter describes how the 
experiments have been conducted and presents the results obtained 
through them. 
 Chapter 5 - Discussions: This chapter discusses the results 
obtained during the experimentation, and compares them to other 
studies that have been performed on the same subject. It also 
evaluates the experimentation procedure. 
 Chapter 6 - Conclusions: This chapter summarizes the main 
findings of this project, and provides a critical evaluation of the work 
that has been done. It also provides directions for future work.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to critically review a literature corpus related to 
the research area. It is divided into four main sections, related to GNSS 
principles, forensics/Anti-forensics applied to Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS) and Garmin devices respectively. 
The first section provides a background knowledge of navigation systems to 
the neophyte. The section first presents the different existing systems, 
before addressing the well-known Global Positioning System, how it 
operates, how it is used in the modern society and what are the limitations 
of the technology. 
The second section is related to GPS forensics. The section first describes 
the GPS devices, their structures, the technology they commonly use, where 
they store the data they collect and so on. In a second part, a state of the art 
concerning GPS forensics is provided, primarily focused on forensic 
acquisition and analysis techniques. This section also explores the legal and 
ethical issues of using GPS data for law enforcement. 
The third section is dedicated to Anti-forensics and reviews the techniques 
already investigated by the forensic community. Two areas are tackled in 
this section. The first is about how someone could use the internal memory 
properties of a device to hide data inside it, whereas the second is more 
about manipulating locational data on the device, in an attempt to mislead 
an investigator. 
The last section is a critical review of the literature related to Garmin 
forensics specifically. This part describes mainly the techniques that have 
been used to investigate such devices, the main outcomes and findings of 
these papers, as well as the challenge commonly encountered when dealing 
with Garmin systems. 
2.2 Global Navigation Satellite System 
From the early 1960s to now, the GPS (i.e. Global Positioning System) has 
come a long way, becoming more prevalent with the passing of time, even 
being ubiquitous since the 2000s (Humphreys, 2012). The antonomasia is 
now the most established GNSS (i.e. Global Navigation Satellite System) 
provider around the world and enables much more than the navigational 
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purpose for which it was designed. As GPS chips become accessible, the 
range of applications grows wider, sometime using them in ways that were 
not intended for (Strawn, 2009). 
This chapter discusses the different GNSSs with a special dedication given 
to the U.S. provider “Navstar GPS” (i.e. NAVigation Satellites by Timing And 
Ranging Global Navigation System). It will be divided into five sections. The 
first one remains general and enumerates the different GNSS providers, 
their status and the services they provide. Then the paper focuses on the 
U.S. provider, and gives its historical background, following by the 
applications it enables. A fourth section explains how Navstar GPS operates 
and what its limitations are. The last section will review jammers and 
spoofing systems as well as their current usage. 
2.2.1 GNSS Providers 
A GNSS is a satellite navigation system that provides global coverage. 
Currently, the U.S. Navstar GPS (National Coordination Office for Space-
Based Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2014) and the Russian GLONASS 
(i.e. Global'naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema) (Federal space 
agency, 2014; Hofmann-Wellenhof, Lichtenegger, & Wasle, 2007) share the 
market. They will probably be joined soon by the European Galileo 
(European GNSS Agency, 2014) and the Chinese Beidou, formerly called 
"Compass" (China National Space Administration, 2014). GPS has been 
developed in the early ‘60s as a mean to locate U.S. submarines, before being 
used as a valuable asset during the cold war. As a response, the Soviet Union 
developed GLONASS. Although both GPS and GLONASS were first 
designed for military purposes, they opened their services to civilians and 
foreigners (Larsen, 2001). As reported by Larsen, the coexistence between 
both the military and the civilian users seems to work, although this dual 
use of the technology poses a problem. Indeed, despite the assurance of the 
US government, no international law prevents the USA to stop the GPS 
service for national security reasons (Larsen, 2001). As GLONASS belongs 
as well to the military, the same issue must be envisaged. 
This situation stressed Europe and China to start their own project (Larsen, 
2001), "Galileo" and "Beidou" respectively. The "Galileo" project aims to 
respond to this "Need for a European controlled GNSS" (European GNSS 
Agency, 2014). Some services such as air transport or rescue cannot afford 
any downtime from the GNSS provider, nor a degradation of the service. 
This is precisely why "Galileo" provides different services, each related to a 
specific kind of applications (European GNSS Agency, 2014). The following 
Table 1 summarizes these services and the applications they will be using 
for. 
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Table 1 Galileo Services Summary 
Service Scope of application 
Open Service (OS) Free of charge, the service aims to offer an accuracy to 
one metre. It is intended for navigation devices and 
mobile phones (European GNSS Agency, 2014).  
Safety of Life 
(SoL) 
The SoL is a guaranteed service dedicated to critical 
applications with rigorous requirements in terms of 
availability, continuity and accuracy. It includes a 
hashing function providing information on the 
integrity of the signal transmission. The service will be 
used in sectors such as navigation or aviation 
(European Commission, 2011).  
Commercial 
Services (CS) 
This service is an enhanced-encrypted version of the 
open service aiming to provide an accuracy to the 
centimetre, to commercial application (European 
Commission, 2011). According to the European GNSS 
Agency, (2014), the service will be charged.   
Public Regulated 
Services (PRS) 
This encrypted service will be restricted to 
government bodies for sensitive applications. The 
service provides anti-jamming and spoofing detection 
mechanisms (European Commission, 2011). 
  
The European constellation is announced to reach full operational 
capability in 2020, and will consist of 30 satellites positioned in three orbit 
planes (European Union, 2010). Its Chinese equivalent claims it will be fully 
deployed by 2017 (Gibbons, 2014). 
Each of these providers possesses their own constellation of satellites, at a 
standardised altitude. The following Figure 1 shows the altitude of the 
constellations, regarding the GNSS providers. As shown in the figure, each 
provider has its own standardised altitude. GPS satellites fly at 20200 km 
above the sea level (National Coordination Office for Space-Based 
Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2014). GLONASS satellites are located 
1000 km behind (19100 km) (Federal space agency, 2014) whereas the 
Galileo constellation flies at an altitude of 23222 km (European GNSS 
Agency, 2014). 
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Figure 1 GNSS providers satellite altitude (credit: GPS Spotlight) 
 
2.2.2 Navstar GPS History 
In 1957, the launch of "Sputnik 1" by the soviet space program was a success 
that astonished the whole world. As a result, the US program started to 
investigate the radio signal emitted by Sputnik (Kahveci & Can, 2013), 
trying to determine the exact orbit of the Russian Satellite using 
Doppler measurements. One thing leading to another, they realised that the 
inverted process, given the satellite's orbit, could accurately determine a 
receiver position (Parkinson, 1997). This discovery led the NAVY to start the 
"Transit" project in 1960, providing them a mean to locate their submarines 
(Hannay, 2008). The developed system was however too slow, leading to 
the development of "Timation" in 1967, which used range measurements 
instead of Doppler measurements. Meanwhile, the US Air Force developed 
a parallel project, called "621B", which added altitude to the information 
provided. In 1973, they brought together Timation and 621B projects and 
created the "Navstar Global Positioning System" project. Navstar 
introduced the use of atomic clocks into satellites, hence providing very 
accurate timing (Theiss, Yen, & Ku, 2005). 
The US government opened GPS services to civilian and internationals in 
1993, however using different channels. The two channels have different 
caretakers, although the general usage is managed by the Inter-agency GPS 
Executive Board (IGEB) (Larsen, 2001). The civilian grade service, called 
Standard Positioning System (SPS), is under the responsibility of the US 
Department of Transport (DoT) whilst the military grade service, the 
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Precise Positioning System (PPS), belongs to the US Department of Defence 
(DoD). An agreement between the two agencies defines 
the responsibilities of each regarding the overall system (Barrett & England, 
2008). 
Civilian grade GPS was, at its start, purposely degraded by a process called 
"Selective Availability" (SA) (Doherty, 2013). This service was to prevent the 
enemy to use the service against the USA. On the 2nd of May 2000, selective 
availability was turned off, in order to “make GPS more responsive to civil 
and commercial users worldwide” (National Coordination Office for Space-
Based Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2014): "Every civilian GPS 
receiver around the globe went from errors the size of a football field, to 
errors the size of a small room" (Humphreys, 2012). This change led to the 
explosion of GPS devices in popularity. The fear that this function could be 
again turned on led the European to invest on Galileo. But in 2007, a press 
release from the DoD claimed that SA would be permanently discontinued 
and the new satellites will not be equipped with the feature (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2007).  
Whether it is used for military, civilian or humanitarian purposes, Navstar 
GPS is now prevalent in today's world, and numerous applications rely upon 
it. 
2.2.3 GPS Usage and controversy 
2.2.3.1 Applications 
The GPS provides the chip with its location at a known time. Using this 
valuable piece of information, the chip is able to supply the end user with 
three features; Positioning, timing, and point-to-point distance (Theiss et 
al., 2005). These features provide a wide range of applications, which are 
used in a great variety of businesses. As pointed out by Parkinson, (1997), 
most obvious is the navigation uses, regardless the type of motion. Since the 
end of the SA in 2000, the civilian navigation devices market has exploded 
(Humphreys, 2012).  
More recent is the use of GPS for sport purposes. Companies such as Garmin 
propose GPS solution for all kinds of sports such as running, swimming, 
golfing, biking… (Garmin, 2014a). These products act like tracking systems, 
and collect information on the user’s practice. The raw data are then 
uploaded onto a specific website where the user has an account. The web 
application processes this information and gives a feedback to the user on 
his performances. Users can then share a summary of their activities on the 
common social networks, and challenge other users possessing similar 
devices (Garmin Connect, n.d.). Personal training is not the only usage of 
GPS related to sport. For instance, football managers and coaches use GPS 
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as a mean to analyse the motion of their players (Bekraoui, Cazorla, & Léger, 
2010). In their study, Bekraoui et al., (2010) noticed GPS is a cheaper and 
better solution for quantitative analysis on football players, than video 
analysis. They argue that the technology could become in a near future, a 
valuable tool to optimize the preparation of the players.  
With the enhance precision offered by augmentation systems such as DGPS, 
WAAS or EGNOS, farmers can rely upon the technology to automatically 
drive their machines, whilst focusing on other tasks like fertilizer spreading 
(Theiss et al., 2005; Trimble.com, 2014). 
The positioning feature also led to the creation of tracking systems, which 
are becoming more and more common within companies as part of their 
logistic process (Theiss et al., 2005). Tracking systems allow numerous 
applications to companies willing to optimize their process. For instance, 
the enterprise “Digital Dispatch” (Digital Dispatch, 2014) proposes an 
application for taxi dispatching. The solution would benefit to both the user 
and the company using the application, as taxis are faster to pick up the 
client, and only the closer available taxi has to be contacted for the course. 
Tracking systems are also used as security features. The “Triton” form 
Starcom Systems(2014) allows container tracking for security and 
management purposes. These trackers allow companies to optimize their 
logistic process a great deal, and is also used as a mean to look over drivers 
and be sure their trips remain strictly professional (Spencer & Weber, 2013). 
The company TrackYour.co.uk provides “peace of mind for those who care” 
by tracking their children, pets, elderly and so on (TrackYour, 2014). Several 
car rental companies use their GPS appliances to record the customer 
driving behaviour. With this piece of information, the company is then able 
to refuse a customer judged unsafe (Theiss et al., 2005). Trackers can also 
be used by Police, as an investigative tool. In his article, Ball (2008) said: 
“Reliable data puts the suspect there between 9:42 and 10:17 p.m. and 
reveals where she came from and went next”. This clearly underlines the 
impact GPS data on law enforcement. GPS Trackers are now commonly 
placed on suspects’ car, thus allowing the investigators to track their 
movements (David Lee Vs Commonwealth, 2012; Hubbard, 2008). 
Tracking systems however raise concerns about ethic and privacy, which 
will be addressed in the next sub-section. 
Closely related to positioning as it involves the actual position of the chip, 
the point-to-point distance can help to measure things. For instance, the 
water system of Modesto in California has been mapped using GPS chips, 
thus completing the project below budget (Theiss et al., 2005).  
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GPS chips synchronize with the satellites, which have atomic clocks. Hence, 
the time on GPS chips is always close from satellites' times, which make 
them very accurate and valuable for application when accuracy of time is 
paramount. For example, banks use GPS time to synchronize their agencies 
around the world, using this time as a reference for transactions. Other 
applications can be imagined, where two actions must be done 
simultaneously (Theiss et al., 2005). The US Department of Commerce 
report (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000) the time accuracy being 
within 40 billionths of a second. 
At the time of writing, one cannot but notice that GPS chips have been 
embedded in almost every Smartphones on the market, making the 
technology ubiquitous in today’s daily routine (Humphreys, 2012). The 
technology has been widely exploited by the different social networks, which 
access the data legally by providing so-called “features” and use the 
information gathered for target advertisement (Agarwal, D’Angelo, & Jin, 
2008; Baker, 2003), activity yet very lucrative. In a survey conducted by 
Krumm, (2009), it has been shown that people are generally not concerned 
about the privacy of their location, and therefore give the information easily, 
a behaviour that could be described as a “privacy paradox” (Barnes, 2006). 
However, the use of the GPS chips embedded in smartphones might help to 
resolve societal problems, such as traffic jam. Work & Bayen, (2008) 
published a paper where the researcher investigated the possibility of traffic 
monitoring through customers’ devices. The information could be gathered 
directly from the smartphones and therefore ease traffic monitoring. This 
would allow seeing the whole traffic in real-time, and help to prevent traffic 
jams. 
2.2.3.2 Controversy 
Nevertheless, some of these applications raise ethical and privacy concerns. 
The omnipresence of smartphones made GPS even more pervasive than it 
was supposed to be (Humphreys, 2012), thus “invading all walks of life” 
(Iqbal & Lim, 2008). GPS applications that went beyond what was 
imaginable few years ago, and people are using these applications at their 
full potential, sometimes to the detriment of privacy (Iqbal & Lim, 2008; 
Kahveci & Can, 2013; Karim, 2004; Spencer & Weber, 2013).  
Law enforcement in the US is a great instance of this phenomenon, whilst 
tracking suspects can help investigators to resolve a case, the fourth 
amendment prevents them to use the data in court (Hand, 1958).  Despite 
the amendment, the data gathered is generally admitted in court (David Lee 
Vs Commonwealth, 2012; Gershman, 2009; Iqbal & Lim, 2008; Karim, 
2004; Koppel, 2009; Spencer & Weber, 2013). The technology eases the 
investigation and, in the urge of catching the “bad guy”, police forces tend 
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to avoid fundamental principles. “Professional ethic” requires a “sharp 
separation between personal and professional morality” (Postema, 1983), a 
separation which seems to fade away when using tracking systems.  
2.2.4 GPS Principles and limitations 
Navstar GPS is made of three elements called "control", "space" and "user" 
segment (Jones et al., 2008). The "control segment" is in charge to control 
the satellites, which represent the "space segment". The "user segment" 
represents the end-user devices, such as our common navigational systems. 
The Figure 2 below illustrates the interactions between the different 
segments. 
 
Figure 2 GPS segments (credit: ipgfy) 
 
2.2.4.1 The space segment 
The space segment contains, at the time of writing, 32 satellites (US 
Department for Homeland Security, 2014) currently orbiting the earth , see 
Figure 3. Twenty four of them are in use, and the remaining eights act as 
backups. These satellites broadcast their orbital position along with a 
timestamp when the signal has been emitted. As a matter of fact, the 
satellites broadcast on two different frequencies, respectively at 
1575.42MHz (L1, civilian) and 1227.6MHz (L2, military), L2 being 
encrypted (Warner & Johnston, 2003). 
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Figure 3 GPS Constellation (credit: gpswien.at) 
Due to the share of a reference time by the space and the user segment, the 
receiver can extract the position from which the signals have been emitted, 
as well as the time at which it has been emitted and the time of propagation 
between the satellite and the device. The calculation is as follows: 
𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
Given the time of propagation, and given that every electro-magnetic waves 
travel at the speed of light (C), it is possible to calculate the distance (D) 
between the two entities: 
𝐷 =  𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐶 
 
In order to locate accurately a chip on earth, GPS uses trilateration (C. M. 
Colombini et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2008), which is similar to triangulation, 
but using distances instead of angles, as illustrated by the Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Trilateration principle (credit: openclipart) 
Alexandre Arbelet Page 13 
 
In order to illustrate this principle of trilateration, the following is a 
simplified example of how a receiver can determine its position with four 
satellites in view. 
 At 15:03:25.67868765, A GPS receiver has four satellites in view, 
respectively called “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”. All the satellites broadcast 
a timestamp, along with their name. 
 
Satellites Emission Timestamp 
A 15:03:25.67362982 
B 15:03:25.67445559 
C 15:03:25.67032675 
D 15:03:25.67156540 
 
The receiver extracts the timestamps and determines the time 
delay between its clock and those timestamps with the following 
formula:  
𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
And determines the distance with each of these satellites by 
multiplying the time delay with the speed of light (given that the 
speed of light C= 299792458 m/s) 
𝐷 =  𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐶 
 
Satellites Time (s) Distance (m) 
A .00505783  1516299.2878461  
 .00423206  1268739.66980348  
C .00836090  2506534.7620922  
D .00712225  2135196.8339905  
The receiver therefore knows its distance, called range, from 
different known satellites, as illustrated by the Figure 5. Three 
satellites allows a receiver a 3D location on earth, and a fourth 
satellite would allow the receiver to synchronize its clock 
(McWilliam, Teeuw, Whiteside, & Zukowskyj, 2005).  
 
Satellite
A
Satellite
D
Satellite
C
GPS Receiver
 
Figure 5 Trilateration example 
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The satellites positions are known and can be expressed, in an earth-fixed 
frame of reference, by set of coordinates (XS,YS,ZS). Given the distance Di to 
the satellites i, and their respective coordinates (Xi,Yi,Zi), one can 
determine the coordinates of the receiver, (Xr,Yr,Zr), with the following 
equation: 
{
𝐷𝐴 = √(𝑋𝐴 − 𝑋𝑟)2 + (𝑌𝐴 − 𝑌𝑟)2 + (𝑍𝐴 − 𝑍𝑟)2
𝐷𝐵 = √(𝑋𝐵 − 𝑋𝑟)2 + (𝑌𝐵 − 𝑌𝑟)2 + (𝑍𝐵 − 𝑍𝑟)2
𝐷𝐶 = √(𝑋𝐶 − 𝑋𝑟)2 + (𝑌𝐶 − 𝑌𝑟)2 + (𝑍𝐶 − 𝑍𝑟)2
 
According to Parkinson, former GPS Program Director, 4 satellites in view 
are enough to update the time whilst providing longitude, latitude and 
altitude to the chip (Parkinson, 1997). As shown in the Figure 6 below, the 
geodetic latitude is a signed angle comprised between -90° (South) and 90° 
(North) using the equator as plane of reference. The geocentric longitude is 
a signed angle, comprised between -180° (West) and 180°(East), using the 
prime meridian as plane of reference (National Geospacial-Intelligence 
Agency, 1984). 
 
 
Figure 6 Latitude and Longitude (credit: wikimedia) 
 
2.2.4.2 The control segment 
The GPS control segment is the segment in charge for the monitoring and 
the control of the satellites (National Coordination Office for Space-Based 
Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2014). It is mainly responsible for time 
synchronization between the satellites, monitors their “health” and does 
manoeuvres if need be. There are several stations that are part of this control 
segment, located across the world. The following Figure 7 shows their 
location. 
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Figure 7 GPS Control segment (credit: gps.gov) 
As it can be seen in the Figure 7, there are different types of stations. The 
“Master control station” is the only station allowed to control and 
manipulate the satellites. If for some reason the master station is 
unavailable, an alternate master station can be used instead. Monitor 
stations are in charge of collecting data coming from the satellites (such as 
navigation signals, atmospheric data…) and tracking the satellites. There are 
currently 16 monitor stations, belonging to the Air Force and the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Ground antennas are used to 
communicate with the satellites, whilst Air Force Satellite Control Network 
(AFSCN) remote tracking stations offer to the control segment an increased 
visibility over the satellites (McWilliam et al., 2005; National Coordination 
Office for Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing, 2014; 
Parkinson, 1997; Theiss et al., 2005). 
2.2.4.3 The user segment 
The user segment represents the end user devices. Every device that has an 
embedded GPS chip in it is therefore considered as being part of the user-
segment. Examples of devices from the user-segment can be GPS navigation 
systems, smartphones, GPS jammers, GPS based timing systems and so on 
(Parkinson, 1997). 
2.2.4.4 Limitations 
On its way from the space to the user device, the radio signal might be 
somehow disturbed, which can affect the accuracy of the location calculated. 
These effects can be divided into two categories, “local” and “atmospheric” 
effects (McWilliam et al., 2005). 
Atmospheric effects are disturbance occurring in the different layers 
constituting the atmosphere. These perturbations occur as the wave goes 
from an environment to another, with a different optical density, 
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which slightly infers on its speed, thus causing refraction, as illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Atmospheric effects on GPS accuracy (credit: wikimedia) 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the phenomenon. The satellite emits a signal at the speed 
of light. As the different layers of the atmosphere have different optical 
densities, the speed of the signal will be slightly different from a layer to 
another, hence explaining a small delay (Dubey, Wahi, & Gwal, 2006; 
Klobuchar, 1996). According to McWilliam et al., (2005), the disturbance 
caused by the ionosphere results in a loss of accuracy of 5 to 10 metres, 
although this effect may produce errors up to 30 metres. Tropospheric 
effects, however, have a smaller impact. Indeed, the potential error related 
to this kind of effects is inferior to 5 metres, and generally does not go above 
2 metres of inaccuracy. 
In order to correct the inaccuracies due to refraction, augmentation systems 
have been developed (Jones et al., 2008). An Augmentation system can be 
ground-based such as the Differential GPS (DGPS), or Satellite-based such 
as Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) for the US or European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) for the Europe. Both 
systems works with reference stations positioned at known location, which 
will analyse the radio signal and send a calibration signal to the end user, 
through a different canal (Parkinson, 1997). As shown in Figure 9, ground 
and satellites based systems differ in that ground based-systems will send 
the correction directly to the user, whereas satellites based (illustrated by 
Figure 10) will first transmit to a geosynchronous satellite which will relay 
the correction to the user.  
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Figure 9 DGPS (credit: gpswien.at) 
 
 
Figure 10 WAAS/EGNOS (credit: gpswien.at) 
The advantage of Satellite-based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) is that they 
cover a wider area. The Figure 11 presents the areas covered by the different 
SBAS existing currently. 
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Figure 11 SBAS Coverage (credit: Egnos portal) 
 
According to Strawn (2009) the GPS accuracy can be as good as 3 meter 
when using some sort of augmentation, such as DGPS, WAAS or EGNOS. 
Figure 12 below summarizes the GPS system accuracy. 
 
Figure 12 GPS Accuracy w/ WAAS w/o SA (credit: Utah State University) 
Local effects can also affect GPS devices a great deal. McWilliam et al., 
(2005) reported inaccuracies up to 10000 metres due to errors in the 
receiver’s clock. These errors are thankfully very rare, as devices tend to 
synchronize their time with the satellites as soon as they can (they must have 
four satellites or more in view to do so). Conversely, the environment 
surrounding the receiver affects the system accuracy. As with every electro-
magnetic wave, GPS signals can be reflected by some environment, and 
blocked in others. Therefore, the reliability of the device inside a thick forest 
is not guaranteed. It is possible to loss the signal or have inaccuracies up to 
100 metres. In urban environment, it has been shown that buildings tend to 
reflect the signals, hence creating a so-called “multi-path” effect that 
confuses the receiver. The Figure 13 below illustrates this phenomenon. The 
receiver will catch both reflected and standard signal, and will calculate 
different distances from the same satellite, phenomenon that can infer 
inaccuracies up to 10 metres. 
 
Figure 13 Multi-path effect (credit: precision tracking) 
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Multi-path effect is currently counterbalanced by calculating the covariance 
on the received locational-data, which reduces every types of local 
inaccuracies, as these later are distributed following a Gaussian distribution 
(McWilliam et al., 2005). 
Although it has not been evocated in the literature, another option to 
prevent multi-path effect would be to use anti-spoofing strategies such as 
the ones reported by Key, (1995). Indeed, reflected signals arrive to the 
receiver with a different angle than genuine (non-reflected) signals. As the 
satellites position is known, it is possible to differentiate the two signals, and 
therefore reject reflected signals. 
These inaccuracies are well known. Unfortunately, they still affect GPS 
devices. Although it does not impact our standard navigation devices a lot, 
but to a certain extent, GPS cannot be relied upon as an evidence, nor be 
used in critical applications such as the self-driving car from Google 
(Guizzo, 2011). There is currently no solutions to fix these inaccuracies, 
however, research is currently ongoing, notably (Otero, Otero, & Sánchez, 
2009) who propose to use fuzzy techniques for bounding the tolerance of 
GPS measurements. 
2.2.5 Jamming and GPS Spoofing 
Tracking applications are becoming more and more popular, especially for 
security or logistic reasons. However, as these applications grow, means to 
avoid GPS tracking do likewise. Just like GNSSs, GPS Jammers come from 
the military. According to (Doherty, 2013), some of these devices have been 
used during the war between The US Army and the Iraqis. Civilian-grade 
GPS jammers are used by criminals to steal vehicles whilst blocking the 
tracker (Last, 2009) or by narco-terrorists to prevent drones to identify the 
location of marijuana fields (Doherty, 2013). Jammers, see Figure 14, evolve 
as fast as GPS devices, they have become quite small and can be low powered 
(Strawn, 2009). 
 
Figure 14 GPS Jammer (credit: lelong.com) 
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In order to test GPS devices, GPS signal generators can be used (Iqbal & 
Lim, 2008), however, these devices can be misused and constitute a threat 
to GPS applications. As jammers cause GPS devices to be ineffective, GPS 
Spoofing devices trick GPS devices, feeding them with false information 
(Doherty, 2013). Let us consider a container carried by a truck, with a high 
value content. Jamming the GPS tracker of the truck would trigger alarms, 
and appropriate incident-response would stop the attack. Whereas spoofing 
the signal would go unnoticed and would allow the criminal to hijack the 
truck, waiting the good moment for an ambush, or to kidnap the driver 
(Warner & Johnston, 2003).  
In order to prevent spoofing, the receiver must be able to differentiate 
genuine and forged signals. Warner & Johnston (2003) provide a solution 
to trigger an alarm when the receiver detects suspicious activity. This can be 
achieved through some kind of authentication coming from the GPS 
constellation (Pozzobon, Wullems, & Kubik, 2004), or discrimination 
techniques, as reported by the Volpe report (Volpe, 2001). According to Key 
(1995), the best anti-spoofing technique is to use antennas that measure the 
angle-of-arrival of received signals. Since it is merely impossible for the 
attacker to match the angle-of-arrival from the spoofed signals with the 
satellites, the spoofed signals can be easily ignored. 
2.3 GPS Forensics 
In a paper on the future of digital forensics, (S. L. Garfinkel, 2010) has 
foreseen a problem with the coming prevalence of embedded systems, as 
these can be much harder to image and investigate. In 2009, N. Beebe noted 
that because of non-standardised interfaces and structures, embedded 
systems would represent a list of technical challenges for the forensic 
investigator (Beebe, 2009). Garfinkel supports Beebe’s opinion and points 
out another challenge, the “increasing prevalence of embedded flash 
storage”. This type of storage can be much more difficult to investigate than 
traditional hard drives. Garfinkel also reports that multiple devices typically 
must now be investigated for a single case, which was unusual only a few 
years ago, where the scope of the forensic investigation was limited to a 
single computer with a small amount of memory (S. L. Garfinkel, 2010). 
GPS navigation systems fall under this category, as a large majority of them 
use internal flash memory. Moreover, these devices act as mass storage 
devices, allowing the user to store multiple types of data on it, such as 
pictures, video and documents, thus making the forensic analysis more 
complex. Just as multiple types of files can be stored inside navigation 
devices, GPS data can be found in a wide range of situations, such as pictures 
or applications on smart-phones. Van Eijk & Roeloffs (2010) states that 
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being able to link a position with a picture or a timestamp can be invaluable 
in an investigation. 
 In 2012, an article published in a UK national newspaper illustrated van 
Eijk & Roeloffs (2010) words. According to the article (Daily Mail, 2012), an 
Anonymous affiliated hacker calling himself "w0rmer", broke into four US 
law enforcement websites. In order to claim his victory, w0rmer published 
a picture of his girlfriend, holding a message for the authorities, shown in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Incriminating picture (credit: troyhunt.com) 
Along with the picture, w0rmer had transmitted his GPS coordinates, which 
subsequently allowed the authorities to locate and arrest him. 
GPS navigation devices are now in common use and are allowing extensive 
location tracking. The data yield by these devices could help when 
investigating a range of crimes, from common burglary and theft, to 
grooming, kidnap and murder by providing a history of a suspect’s 
movements through the tracking of his vehicle or phone (Last, 2009). 
Furthermore, these data can also be used for digital profiling as remarked 
by Colombini et al. (2012), who compared GPS satnav devices to "digital 
diaries". Although this field is fast becoming of great importance, current 
literature does not address it thoroughly, and investigators often lack of 
procedures and methodologies to retrieve evidence in a forensically sound 
manner. This lack of procedure can lead to evidence, inculpatory or 
exculpatory, being missed (S. L. Garfinkel, 2010). 
2.3.1 Structure and Operating of satellite navigation systems 
The structure of satellite navigation systems (satnav) is specific to each 
manufacturer and must be known from the forensic investigator in order to 
properly investigate the device (Doherty, 2013). Despite minor changes, the 
overall structure of these devices remains the same (Jones et al., 2008) and 
is basically composed of a radio equipment (receiver), a CPU to compute the 
data, along with Random Access and Storage Memory. The device is 
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operated by an operating system, and interact with the user through an 
output display, generally tactile. In order to extract the data, or charge the 
devices, a USB port is generally included, and more and more devices have 
a Bluetooth interface, allowing them to connect smartphones.  
Some of these components can hold valuable data, or at least give to the 
investigator a good clue on where to search. For instance, the Bluetooth 
connectivity may not be investigated itself, but it provides information on 
what could possibly be found on the device, as this connectivity is usually 
used to connect phones to it and provide some kind of hands free features. 
2.3.1.1 Operating system 
In his book, Doherty (2013) discusses windows CE as being the operating 
system typically used by most devices. However, his review is limited to a 
small amount of devices, thus restraining his view of the area. When 
investigating TomTom Go 500 and 720, van Eijk & Roeloffs (2010) reported 
the operating system as typically being a variety of Linux, a view shared by 
Colombini et al. (2012) who investigated TomTom devices as well. Similarly, 
most of Garmin systems are Linux based, which can be a great advantage 
for forensic analysis, as they are open-source. 
First, Linux-based operating systems are open-source, which mean that the 
manufacturer must publish their source-code, as well as the modification 
they have done in order to adapt the OS for the purpose of the device. Being 
able to analyse the code behind a device can highlight its structure and some 
of its hidden features. In their study, van Eijk & Roeloffs (2010) used the 
open source code to reverse engineer the device and locate where the data 
is stored in the internal memory. They noticed part of the memory was 
denied access by the operating system itself. He therefore modified the 
source code, thus allowing a full analysis of the memory.  
Additionally, a study has shown that Linux-based OSs do not use the “Trim” 
command, used to call the garbage collection process in Solid State Drives 
(SSDs) which is addressed in the next section. This results in higher 
probability of data reminiscence within devices running Linux-based OSs 
(King & Vidas, 2011a). 
2.3.1.2 Embedded memory 
According to Harrill & Mislan, (2007), Satellites navigation systems are 
considered as small scale devices. As such, they use volatile and non-volatile 
memory, and process the data through a CPU. The Random Access Memory 
(RAM) constitutes the volatile memory, which loses its content when not 
powered. As such, it is harder to investigate and the acquisition process 
becomes a critical process that needs to be done before the device run out of 
battery.  
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Although it needs a different procedure than for standard non-volatile 
memory analysis and might be more challenging for the investigator, the 
data held in this part of the device can be paramount. Indeed, just like in 
TomTom devices, RAM may contain data of forensic interest such as 
timestamps, which are never stored in the persistent memory, as reported 
by the experiment conducted by van Eijk & Roeloffs (2010). At the time of 
writing, no study addressing RAM forensics has been conducted on Garmin 
devices. 
Conversely, the non-volatile memory represents the most important 
component of the device, at least from a forensics point of view. It is used to 
store where the user has been since he bought the device. Several studies 
have been published on it, but they usually access the memory through the 
device, which may sometimes update timestamps and therefore impact the 
integrity of the device (Nutter, 2008). In 2008, (Nutter, 2008) divided GPS 
devices into three categories:  
 With SD cards 
 With internal hard drives 
 With internal flash memory 
However, devices with internal hard drives tend to be rare, as manufacturer 
tend to prefer internal flash drives. Colombini (2009) also divides the 
devices into three categories, which seems to be more realistic: 
 With internal memory only 
 With SD card only 
 With SD card and internal memory 
2.3.1.3 Flash storage 
Over the past few years, flash memory has gained in popularity because of 
its resistance to shock, power consumption (Sansurooah, 2009), 
performance and reliability (Huang, Chang, Kuo, Hsieh, & Lin, 2008). Flash 
memory is also called "solid state memory" and is a type of electrically 
erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) (Sansurooah, 2009) 
which can be available in two types; NAND-based or NOR-based. Both these 
types share a common chip architecture, illustrated by the Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Flash chip architecture (credit: KING & VIDAS, 2011) 
As shown in the Figure 16, a flash memory chip is composed of planes. Each 
plane is composed of blocks, each block is composed of pages which are 
composed of cells (King & Vidas, 2011a). NAND and NOR memories differ 
in the way cells are interconnected (Fiorillo, 2009; King & Vidas, 2011a), 
and by their access patterns (Sansurooah, 2009). Whilst NOR-based 
memory uses random access and can retrieve information at a byte level 
(Harrill & Mislan, 2007), NAND memory read and write data on a page 
basis (Fiorillo, 2009; Huang et al., 2008).  This feature makes NAND-flash 
reliant on an external RAM, as illustrated by the following Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17 Access pattern of NAND and NOR memories (credit: FIORILLO, 2009) 
 
The figure points out the need for NAND-based memory, to have an external 
RAM to operate properly. These characteristics have a strong impact on the 
usage of these types of memory. In 2011, the blog Embedded Domain 
published a comparative study on NAND and NOR memory. The following 
Figure 18 reports their findings and gives a highlight on the possible usage 
of these memories.    
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Figure 18 Usage of NAND and NOR memories (credit: Embedded Domain) 
Additionally, according to Fiorillo (2009) NAND-based memory tend to be 
cheaper than NOR whilst offering a similar performance. However, it is less 
stable and needs a supporting RAM to work. As a matter of fact, NOR-based 
memory is generally used to store the operating system, whereas and 
NAND-based memory would be privileged for the storage capabilities of the 
device (Harrill & Mislan, 2007).  
Another important characteristic of flash memory is its inability to program 
a value from “0” to “1”(Fiorillo, 2009; Sansurooah, 2009). In fact, the initial 
state of the memory is all 1s. Writing the memory consists in program the 
value from “1” to “0”. If an update is needed, the information will be rewrite 
somewhere else inside the memory, and the former location will be marked 
as invalid (Fiorillo, 2009). When the numbers of invalid blocks reach a 
certain threshold, a background process, called “Garbage Collection”, 
reclaims the blocks invalidated and erases them properly (setting them to 
all 1s). From a forensic point of view, "garbage collection" makes data 
retrieval a lot harder than with standard non-volatile memory (M. 
Breeuwsma & Jongh, 2007; Fiorillo, 2009; Huang et al., 2008; King & 
Vidas, 2011a; Sansurooah, 2009). 
However, King & Vidas, (2011) published a study in which they claim that 
solid state disk data retention relied on the Operating System in use. They 
conducted an experiment in which they compared data retention under the 
different OSs, with different Solid State Drives, and with different type of 
usage. Their results are resumed in the following Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Percent blocks recovered by test and OS type (credit: KING & VIDAS, 2011) 
 The results show that the recovery percentage is first related to the type of 
controller. Indeed, data recovery seems harder in storage using controller 
allowing the ATA/SCSI TRIM command, which allows to the OS to call the 
garbage collection on a certain block (King & Vidas, 2011a). The second 
interesting result is that even when TRIM was enabled, the recovery process 
reached a high success level. King explains this result by reporting that 
Ubuntu has a lack of TRIM support, and uses quick format procedure. 
The OS and the type of controller used by the flash storage are therefore 
crucial factors to consider when investigating embedded devices such as 
Satnavs.  
2.3.2 Forensic acquisition of satellite navigation systems 
Forensic acquisition of a device is typically a delicate process that aims to 
acquire digital evidence in a way that "ensures its authenticity and integrity" 
(Casey, 2011). Part of the preservation process, considered as a key concept 
by the DFRWS (Palmer, 2001), the device must conserve its origin state 
after the procedure. The following section reviews the different techniques 
used to acquire satellite navigation devices among the dedicated literature. 
About the categories introduced earlier, this section will first cover SD card 
acquisition, then flash memory and finally RAM. 
2.3.2.1 SD Card 
As reported by Colombini (2009), some navigation systems use SD cards for 
principal persistent storage, or as an extent of memory. This memory is 
likely to hold user related data and may include potential evidence that is 
not related the GPS usage, for example the uploading of non GPS data such 
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as pirated movies (Strawn, 2009). SD card is easily removable from the 
device, therefore, best practices would be not to power on the device, and 
take a copy of it through a write blocker. 
In 2008, Hannay published a paper dedicated to SD Card forensic 
acquisition. The methodology he designed consists of a sequence of simple 
steps, aiming to acquire the non-volatile memory contained on the device 
SD card in a non-invasive way, and verify its integrity through hashing 
algorithms.  A bit-stream acquisition is then performed, following the 
designed methodology, using the Linux “dd” command and a SD card reader 
converted in a write blocker for the occasion. The Figure 20 shows the SD 
card reader converted in write-blocker by Hannay. To do so, he bended the 
pin dedicated to the data input of the SD card, hence making it physically 
unable to write on the SD Card. Hannay did not analyse the content of the 
memory he acquired, but his study showed that powering on the device 
involves data being written on the SD card, even though this latter has its 
write protect tab set. In 2008, he wrote another article, aiming to analyse 
the data that could be found on a TomTom one and performed the same 
process to acquire it.  
 
Figure 20 Modified SD card reader (credit: HANNAY, 2008) 
(Lemere & Sayers, 2009) recommend using a dedicated write blocker as 
shown in Figure 21, it will have the same result as Hannay's approach, 
although more expensive. 
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Figure 21 UltraBlock USB 3.0 Forensic Card Reader (credit: digital intelligence) 
(Lim, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2012) report the use of FTK imager to acquire the 
SD card, however, unlike (Hannay, 2008; Lemere & Sayers, 2009), Lim did 
not use any specific device to acquire the memory, and used the device itself 
(an XROAD navigation v7) to do so. Doing so present a huge risk to 
compromise the integrity of the system, as simply powering on the device 
will induce access to the memory. Moreover, Lim did not use any Faraday 
cage of any sort, therefore, the device, once on, might have acquire a GPS 
fix, hence altering the memory. Colombini (2009) did the same mistake and 
acquired the data through the device. It has to be noted that once a GPS 
device is powered on, its first process will be to get a GPS fix for its position. 
The obtaining of this fixes results in the alteration of the memory, hence the 
device integrity. Therefore, a Faraday cage must be used to prevent GPS 
signal to reach the device (Jones et al., 2008; Lemere & Sayers, 2009; 
Nutter, 2008; Willassen, 2005). 
2.3.2.2 Flash Memory 
Acquiring flash memory tends to be a much harder process than the SD 
card, as it cannot be removed from the device. This problem does not only 
concern satnav forensics, but advantages brought by flash memories make 
them ubiquitous in embedded systems. Furthermore, it seems there is no 
documented standard procedure to acquire internal memory (Willassen, 
2005). Fiorillo (2009) divides flash memory acquisition into two categories: 
physical and logical acquisition [Figure 22]. Concerning satnav devices, 
logical acquisition consists in mounting the device as a mass storage device, 
and retrieves, with a basic drag and drop, the files that may contain 
information. Mounting the device may influence the logical integrity of the 
system, and therefore shall not be used without a write-blocker. Logical 
acquisition is a fast and easy way to extract information from a device. If the 
information the investigator seeks is located inside a known file, this might 
be the best approach to consider. However, as pointed out by Nutter (2008), 
significant amounts of data can be retrieved in unallocated clusters, which 
cannot be accessed without a bit-per-bit copy of the memory. Since 
retrieving deleted files within the memory can be paramount to 
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investigators, it is better to consider a physical acquisition, which will allow 
this bit-per-bit procedure. 
 
Figure 22 Logical Vs Physical Acquisition (credit: FIORILLO, 2009) 
In a study on flash data recovery, (M. Breeuwsma & Jongh, 2007) identified 
Flasher tools as certainly the less invasive technique to extract flash memory 
of a device. These tools are devices that will upload what is known as “flash 
loader” software into the RAM and execute it to get a low-level access to the 
memory. It has to be considered that the RAM will be damaged. As such, 
extracting the RAM first would be essential. Flasher tools however seem to 
be more common for cell-phone forensics rather than for GPS forensics. 
Similar tools such as Device seizure from Paraben (Paraben, 2014) can also 
be used, therefore allowing investigators to acquire GPS devices without 
impacting the logical integrity of the system.  
JTAG ports are test access ports that are generally used to debug embedded 
systems (Greenberger & Homayoon, 1994). However, it can access flash 
memory and therefore being used to image flash storage (I. M. F. 
Breeuwsma, 2006; Fiorillo, 2009; King & Vidas, 2011a; Sansurooah, 2009; 
Willassen, 2005) or RAM memory (van Eijk & Roeloffs, 2010). The copy can 
be a long process, Van Eijk reported 40 minutes to image a 32MB RAM; at 
a constant pace, the process will need 21.3 hours to image 1 GB. As the 
technique might affect the physical integrity of the device as well, the 
technique should not be used unless there is no other choice. 
Another way to extract the memory is to de-solder flash memory chips with 
the appropriate equipment and read them with a memory chip reader (M. 
Breeuwsma & Jongh, 2007; Willassen, 2005). The advantage of this 
technique is that it bypasses the OS, thus avoiding possible logging 
mechanisms likely to influence the memory. However, as remarked by 
Dickson, (2014), such techniques are rather expensive and often cannot be 
used for investigations on a daily basis.    
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(Fiorillo, 2009) also reports that it is possible to get data from the flash 
memory of a system using infrared and Bluetooth interfaces using the 
OBEX protocol. This approach however can only retrieve small part of 
information, and therefore could not be used to acquire the entire memory.  
The techniques formerly presented are however rarely used in practical 
situations, where investigators acquire those devices generally by connected 
them to a computer with a USB cable. With regards to "physical 
acquisition", investigators do not mount the device, and turn it on, then they 
are able to image the flash memory through commands like "dd", or 
software like FTK Imager  (AccessData, 2014; C. Colombini, 2009; Iqbal & 
Lim, 2008; Jones et al., 2008; Lemere & Sayers, 2009; Nutter, 2008). 
Investigators must however be aware that turning on the device might alter 
the data on the memory. In his study, Nutter (2008) reported that turning 
on his TomTom device had updated four different files timestamps. 
2.3.2.3 RAM 
Despite Random Access Memory can hold as much valuable data as 
persistent storage, few researches have been done on the subject. (van Eijk 
& Roeloffs, 2010) investigated TomTom Go Series RAM and found 
timestamps that could be linked to positions, hence providing information 
that could be essential in case of an investigation. Their study first 
investigated the different scenarios that could lead to a power loss. Then 
they used JTAG ports to acquire the memory, following the procedure 
exposed in (I. M. F. Breeuwsma, 2006). Additionally the study reports that 
if a bootable system image were to be loaded on the SD Card of the device, 
the navigation system would boot on that image in priority. The author then 
loaded a small-modified Linux distribution on the system, allowing him to 
extract the RAM. Note that this technique could also be used with persistent 
storage. 
Another study conducted by (Rabaiotti & Hargreaves, 2010), proposes a 
software exploit approach to extract the RAM of an embedded system. 
Indeed, the study proves that it is possible to exploit a buffer overflow 
vulnerability to extract the entire RAM out of an XBOX console. Although 
the scope of its experiment is limited to gaming consoles, Rabaiotti believes 
that the process would work with GPS devices as well.   
2.3.3 Forensic analysis and files of interest 
Memory embedded on portable systems such as GPS keeps growing in size, 
making difficult forensics investigations. Forensic analysis is a time-
consuming process, which cannot afford to take every file into consideration 
(S. L. Garfinkel, 2010). Optimising this process is possible by documenting 
the inner file structure of the device, and knowing where the information of 
Alexandre Arbelet Page 31 
 
interest might be hold. However, as reported by Jones et al., (2008) since 
GPS devices act as mass storage devices, they are likely to hold all types of 
data, and not only locational data. Investigators might come across data 
related to conventional cyber-crime, such as pirated movies, and should 
keep in mind this eventuality. 
With regards to the common files that can be found on such systems, the 
current literature regularly mentions POIs (i.e. points of interests) and 
typed destinations as potential evidence (C. Colombini, 2009; Last, 2009; 
Lemere & Sayers, 2009). Hannay, (2008) published a study in which he 
listed the recoverable information on Tom-Tom devices, depending on their 
operational mode. These experiments showed Tom-Tom devices were 
storing the routes computed by the device, as well as the favourite locations 
stored by the user. However, this information has its limitations, as there is 
no way to tell where the user has actually been. Another study conducted by 
C. M. Colombini et al. (2012) permitted to recover where the user has 
actually been, by installing a “logging enabler” on the device. 
Since they can put someone on the crime scene within a time frame, 
timestamps are also of great value to investigators (Ball, 2008).Tom-Tom 
devices use this information but does not store it (Nutter, 2008), however, 
it is possible to recover some of them by inspecting the RAM of the device 
(van Eijk & Roeloffs, 2010). 
As the devices evolve, they bring new features that may come along its lot of 
information. Bluetooth capability for instance, makes the device storing 
information about contacts, emitted and received calls or text messages 
(Ball, 2008; C. M. Colombini et al., 2012). Additionally, as pointed out by C. 
M. Colombini et al., (2012), configuration files may contain information 
useful to establish a behavioural profile of the user, such as the language he 
speaks, his common whereabouts and so on. 
2.3.4 Legal issues for GPS data 
The use of GPS data for investigative purpose has become widespread, as it 
provides valuable information on a subject's movements (C. M. Colombini 
et al., 2012). This information can be used for a variety of purposes, such as 
studying the modus operandi of a criminal, or help to resolve crimes related 
to paedophilia, theft, robbery and so on... Recently, GPS data has been used 
in courts to verify alibis, or charge suspects. This usage raises questions over 
the reliability and accuracy of GPS data (Iqbal & Lim, 2008; Lallie & 
Benford, 2011), and the ethics in making tracking systems admissible in 
court (Hubbard, 2008). 
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2.3.4.1 Reliability and admissibility of GPS Data 
In 2012, GPS data has been used as compelling evidence to charge sex 
offender David Lee (David Lee Vs Commonwealth, 2012), and Hubbard 
(2008), witnessed more than 70 cases using GPS data in court of law within 
a period of three years. Cases involving GPS data are becoming more 
frequent (Hubbard, 2008). However, as pointed out by Iqbal & Lim (2008), 
the legal literature does not question the accuracy nor the authenticity of 
GPS signals. Drivers are acquitted of speeding charges based on their 
satnavs (Williams, 2008), whilst devices reporting speeds of 3000000 mph 
are also admitted in court (Iqbal & Lim, 2008).   
"DNA just puts the accused at the scene. Reliable GPS data puts the suspect 
there between 9:42 and 10:17 p.m." Ball said (Ball, 2008). However, non-
reliable GPS data can lead to injustice, with people wrongly charged and 
suspects exonerated due to false alibis. This report presented situations 
where GPS data could not be trusted, nor be considered as accurate 
(Parkinson, 1997; Theiss et al., 2005). It also has presented situations where 
people were able to modify the data held inside their devices, thus impacting 
the investigation outcomes (Iqbal & Lim, 2008; Lallie & Benford, 2011). 
Even though this information can mislead intentionally or unintentionally 
a case, legal discussions seem to ignore the problem and rather focus on 
ethical concerns aroused by GPS tracking, influencing the fourth 
amendment (David Lee Vs Commonwealth, 2012; Koppel, 2009; McGrath, 
2011). 
2.4 GPS Anti-forensics 
"The criminal genius is a creature of comic books and movies." (Ball, 2008). 
The lack of accuracy of GPS data, and its vulnerability to anti-forensic 
techniques raise concerns about whether or not such data should be 
admissible in court. Whilst the research community tries to warn about the 
impact of anti-forensic techniques (Harrill & Mislan, 2007; King & Vidas, 
2011b; Lallie & Benford, 2011; Strawn, 2009), practitioners, based on their 
in-the-field experience, believe that criminals typically would not have the 
knowledge to use such techniques.     
However, anti-forensics techniques exist, and, according to Nolan et al. 
(2005), criminals are aware of the residential data that may reside on 
electronic devices. Solutions can be envisaged, and must be, in order to 
prevent criminals to create their evidences as their will. Concerning GPS 
devices, anti-forensics can be considered at two different levels. First, there 
is the internal memory, where evidence can be hidden or 
destroyed, then the GPS data, which can be modified, or forged.  
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2.4.1.1 Internal memory 
Operating Systems use memory, regardless the underlying technology. To 
do so, these technologies must provide a way for the OS to interface with the 
memory. Solid state memories use a feature called "Flash Translation Layer" 
(FTL) for this purpose (Huang et al., 2008). According to King & Vidas 
(2011), Solid State Drives (SSDs) may relocate data, without the OS 
reporting it. This feature could be misused in an attempt to hide data. 
Furthermore, their study demonstrated that manipulating the TRIM 
command might trigger the garbage collection and therefore, wipe a whole 
disk. Although TRIM is a command related to the ATA interfacing scheme, 
equivalents of the TRIM command are commonly found among the other 
types of interface (SCSI, SD). These characteristics can be used for anti-
forensics, allowing a criminal to hide data inside his device, or to wipe its 
whole memory within seconds (King & Vidas, 2011a). 
2.4.1.2 Geo-positional anti-forensics 
As stated by Nolan et al. (2005), there is no doubt that criminals are now 
aware of the evidence an investigator is able to recover from the devices they 
carry. If Ball, (2008) is wrong, that would mean that these criminals are able 
to manipulate these devices in a way they provide alibis instead 
of exculpatory evidences when investigated. In 2008, Iqbal & Lim 
investigated GPS tracking systems, in order to see if it was possible to edit 
the data stored inside them. The study concludes that there is no method to 
validate the data, or verify the authenticity of the data recovered.  
Another study leaded by Lallie & Benford (2011) obtained the same results, 
by extracting data out of an IPhone, editing it, and then put back the 
modified data in lieu of the genuine data. Both studies question the 
reliability and therefore the liability of these evidences, which could have 
been somehow compromised before being considered in a trial. 
The concerns raised by the forensics community regarding anti-forensics 
techniques are not shared by the practitioners. Ball, (2008) considers the 
criminal genius as utopic and does not consider anti-forensics as a threat. 
An interview conducted with NHTCUS (i.e. National Hi-Tech Crime Unit in 
Scotland) representative Mike Dickson outlined the same conclusions. 
According to M. Dickson, criminals are more likely to send someone driving 
around with their GPS device than manipulating the data inside it. However, 
it is important to know what is possible on this type of devices, in order not 
to be surprised if such event were to happen. 
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2.5 Garmin satellite navigation systems 
Among the GPS forensic literature, only a very small section considers the 
firm Garmin, and yet it is considered the market leader in some areas. 
Studies tend to be focused on TomTom devices which are predominately 
used for vehicle navigation (Dickson, 2014). This section investigates the 
state of the art of Garmin forensics; the research that has been performed 
compared to other devices; considers the results from current research; and 
looks at the challenges related to this area of navigation devices forensics. 
The study conducted by (Jones et al., 2008) in 2008 seems to be the first to 
tackle Garmin devices. Three Garmin models have been investigated, a Nüvi 
200W, a Nüvi 310 and a StreetPilot 510c. A TomTom GO 710 was also part 
of the study. The results of the study report the discovery of one GPS artefact 
in particular in Garmin devices: the "Current.gpx file", whereas Tom-tom 
contained several GPS data files. The analysis of this file showed that it 
contained the favourite locations entered by the user in a XML format. 
(Jones et al., 2008) concluded that further research was needed on these 
types of devices. 
In 2012, in a study on digital profiling through GPS based evidences, (C. M. 
Colombini et al., 2012) investigated a Garmin device, but unfortunately did 
not analyse the findings. The files and folders found on the device are 
however listed, and the same Current.gpx was found, along with a folder 
called "archive". Both were found in a folder "gpx", located at the root of the 
device. 
Blog articles were found, providing further information on Garmin devices. 
In 2008, Electronics360 disassembles a Garmin Nüvi 200W, hence 
revealing the internal components [Figure 23 and Figure 24]. 
 
Figure 23 Nüvi 200W: PCB, Top side (credit: electronic360) 
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Figure 24 Nüvi 200W: PCB, Bottom side (credit: electronic360) 
As shown in Figure 24, the Garmin Nüvi 200W uses a NAND flash memory, 
which, as stated in section 2.3.1, can be subject to alteration due to the 
garbage collector and wear-levelling mechanism. 
Then the blog “Forensics from the sausage factory” posted an article about 
Garmin forensics. It presents the outcomes of an investigation on a Nüvi 
200, and the same "Current.gpx" file, introduced earlier by Jones’s study. 
According to the author, "Recently found location" did not appeared to be 
saved within the user accessible memory (Forensics from the sausage 
factory, 2009). 
As the literature and the blogs seem to suggest, Garmin typically did not 
store much data that easily could be of use to an investigator. However, since 
2010, things seem to have changed. In his blog, (Lehr, 2010) reports on a 
tracking feature, enabled by-default on most Garmin devices. According to 
him, there is no need for the user to enter a destination. The device starts 
logging its position as soon as it is turned on. Garmin called this feature the 
“Triplog”, and defines it as being the “electronic equivalent of laying down a 
breadcrumb trail to mark the path that has been travelled” (Garmin, 2014b).   
From a forensics point-of-view, such feature has a paramount importance. 
Actually, Garmin devices are rarely turned off, a short pressure on the power 
button will only turn off the screen (like a smartphone). Moreover, the 
battery expectancy in sleep mode can be quite long. Therefore, it can be 
inferred that people, using regularly their Garmin device for navigation 
purpose, are tracked by the feature at all times, and that all their trips have 
been logged inside the navigation system. Lehr reports having seen devices 
with 6 months of history. Garmin, however, reports that 10000 points can 
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be stored within a Triplog file, and up to 20 files can be archived on the 
device (Garmin, 2014b). What is interesting is that the file containing that 
information is still called "Current.gpx". Lehr suggests that the file contains 
the most recent log, and the folder "archive" contains older logs renamed 
"1.gpx", "2.gpx" and so on. 
Another article on forensicsblog.com confirms this behaviour on recent 
Garmin devices. Additionally, files with an extension ".db" have been found, 
suggesting the use of SQLite databases (DBs). As far as the author is 
concerned, those files do not have forensic value as they are sparsely 
populated, but further research is needed in order to see exactly how these 
files are used by the system (fork(), 2013). The author extracted the data and 
plotted them on a map using Google earth [Figure 25]. 
 
Figure 25 Data retrieved from a Garmin device on Google earth (credit: fork()) 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The first part of this literature review provided background information on 
the origin of GPS, its initial purpose and how prevalent it has become. By 
reviewing GNSS principles and limitations, it also showed that GPS data 
might not be as reliable as it seems to be, due to inaccuracies and systems 
used to disrupt GPS signals (Iqbal & Lim, 2008; Theiss et al., 2005).  
Conversely, the data contained inside Satnavs can be of crucial value, and 
mature methodologies aiming to investigate these devices have not been yet 
well defined (Harrill & Mislan, 2007). The literature surrounding GPS 
forensics remains focused on Tom-Tom devices, disregarding other brands 
such as Garmin. The section 2.3 investigated the current techniques and 
challenges related to Satnav forensics, regardless of the brand. Studies 
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related to forensic acquisition of GPS devices highlighted that the 
successfulness of the imaging process rely on the device itself. As underlined 
by Nutter (2008), small interactions between the user and the device may 
compromise its integrity. Other techniques are conceivable, but they are 
mainly based upon peculiar characteristics of GPS devices and might not be 
reproducible (Rabaiotti & Hargreaves, 2010; van Eijk & Roeloffs, 2010).   
The section 2.4 investigated the literature related to anti-forensics. Even-
though anti-forensics have not been yet performed on Garmin nor Tom-
Tom devices, their inner-structure makes them potentially vulnerable to it. 
Studies showed that locational artefacts of other device such as 
smartphones were vulnerable to anti-forensic techniques. Further research 
should therefore be conducted on GPS devices, to evaluate the risk of 
locational data being manipulated.  
The last focused on the brand Garmin, which seems to be neglected by both 
forensic community and investigators. Peer reviewed studies related to 
these devices are rare, and yet only a couple of forensic specialized blogs 
discussed this topic. The lack of knowledge concerning these devices may 
lead to mistakes that could make evidence ineligible in a court of law (S. L. 
Garfinkel, 2010). Based on similar studies on Tom-Tom devices, 
experiments should be conducted on Garmin devices, in an attempt to 
highlight how they operate and store location-tracking data. The structure 
of Garmin devices must be clearly defined, and the behaviour well 
understood in order to avoid altering the device memory and being able to 
recover the most from it. 
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Chapter 3 Experimental design 
3.1 Introduction 
As highlighted by the literature review, there is a lack of understanding and 
research concerning Garmin GPS devices. How they operate and manage 
their data has not been yet documented by the research community. 
Additionally, acquisition and analysis techniques formerly used for Tom-
Tom devices might be inappropriate or inefficient for Garmin GPS. In an 
attempt to optimize the overall forensic investigation procedure, 
experiments have been designed and divided into three main categories; 
“Acquisition”, “Analysis” and “Anti-forensics”. Each of these categories 
contains a certain amount of “research questions” (RQs), which are used to 
define the scope of the experiments.  
Forensic acquisition can be performed with different techniques (van Eijk & 
Roeloffs, 2010), which will have a different impact on the logical or physical 
integrity of the devices (Nutter, 2008). To highlight these consequences, the 
first category investigates the different methods and tools that can be used 
to image the memory of Garmin devices.  
As stated by S. L. Garfinkel (2010), the lack of knowledge concerning a 
device might lead to evidence being routinely missed by investigators. The 
second category aims therefore to document how Garmin devices operate 
and store their data. This category also aims to evaluate how likely a data is 
to remain inside the memory with the passing of time. 
The last category addresses the question of anti-forensic techniques within 
Garmin devices. Although the study was conducted on IPhones, Lallie & 
Benford (2011) showed how locational data can be manipulated without 
leaving traces. This last category’s purpose is therefore to study the 
achievability of anti-forensic techniques on Garmin devices, with a focus on 
data modification. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first one introduces the 
devices that will be used throughout the experiments, whereas the second, 
third and fourth sections are dedicated to the aforementioned categories, 
“Acquisition”, “Analysis” and “Anti-forensics” respectively. 
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3.2 Devices considered 
The experiment designed in this chapter is conducted on a set of three 
Garmin navigation devices, all of them from the Nüvi range. Additionally, a 
fourth device may be used in some experiment, acting as a reference. The 
devices are a Nüvi 1340, a Nüvi 2515 and a Nüvi 2595. The reference device 
is a Nüvi 2595 as well. The characteristics of these devices are described 
below.  
 
3.2.1 Nüvi 1340 
Release date : 2009 
 
Figure 26 Nüvi 1340 (front) 
 
Figure 27 Nüvi 1340 (back) 
Data cards : Micro SD 
Battery life : 4 hours 
Memory type : Solid State (Flash) 
Memory size : ≈4 GB 
Bluetooth : No 
Waypoints : 1000 
Triplog feature : NC 
Park position : NC 
 
 
3.2.2 Nüvi 2515 
Release date : 2011 
 
Figure 28 Nüvi 2515 (front) 
 
Figure 29 Nüvi 2515 (back) 
Data cards : Micro SD 
Battery life : 2.5 hours 
Memory type : Solid State (Flash) 
Memory size : ≈2 GB 
Bluetooth : yes 
Waypoints : 1000 
Triplog feature : yes 
Park position : yes 
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3.2.3 Nüvi 2595 
Release date : 2011 
 
Figure 30 Nüvi 2595 (front) 
 
Figure 31 Nüvi 2595 (back) 
Data cards : Micro SD 
Battery life : 2.5 hours 
Memory type : Solid State (Flash) 
Memory size : ≈8 GB 
Bluetooth : yes 
Waypoints : 1000 
Triplog feature : yes 
Park position : yes 
 
3.3 Acquisition 
Although the analysis can be conducted on the device itself, it is more 
common to acquire a copy of the memory for further analysis. As data can 
be lost, or altered and therefore not recognized as evidence, the “Acquisition 
process” is a paramount phase in a digital forensic investigation (Carrier, 
2005). With regards to Garmin devices, the literature reviewed did not 
addressed the acquisition procedure itself in depth, and usually relies on 
well-known acquisition software such as FTK Imager (AccessData, 2014).  
The intent of this section is therefore to design a set of experiments aiming 
to evaluate the tools and techniques that can be used to image Garmin 
devices in a forensically sound manner, with regard to the behaviour of the 
device. The experimentation design is driven by a core question, and aims 
to address a set of RQs. This section is therefore divided accordingly into 
two sub-sections, the first describing the main objective of this set of 
experiments and its related RQs, the second describing the experiment 
themselves. 
3.3.1 Research questions 
In order to address the needs of this study, the experiments must be 
designed following a main objective, which is driven by the overall aim of 
the research; acquire the data held by Garmin navigation systems whilst 
preserving their integrity. This objective is supported by a set of RQs, which 
are inspired by the literature reviewed. As highlighted by the blog fork() 
(2013) on Garmin systems and a study published by Nutter (2008) on Tom-
Tom, even minor interactions with devices can have an impact on their 
memory, hence altering the evidence. The RQs listed in Table 2, therefore 
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aim to identify those interactions through the experimentation, in an 
attempt to raise the awareness of forensic investigators. They address two 
different subjects, RQ1 to RQ6 are related to the behaviour of the device, 
whereas RQ7 and RQ8 are more focused on the tools and techniques used 
to perform the acquisition. 
Core objective: “Acquire the data held by Garmin navigation systems in a 
forensically sound manner” 
Table 2 RQs related to the Acquisition process 
Codes Research questions and hypothesis 
Acq-RQ1 
Acq-RQ2 
“Does turning on (RQ1)/off (RQ2) a Garmin device has an impact on 
its integrity?” 
 
As it has been pointed out by the literature, some devices may log 
the time at which they have been turned on/off (fork(), 2013). 
This behaviour has been observed on a Garmin Nüvi 1490, but the 
hypothesis is that this behaviour is likely to be present in other 
model of the brand.  
Acq-RQ3 “Does connecting the device to another entity via USB has an 
impact on its integrity?” 
 
Likewise, a study conducted by Nutter (2008) on Tom-Tom 
navigation systems showed that timestamps were updated when 
the device were connected to a computer. With regard to Garmin 
devices, no document confirms nor disproves such behaviour.  
Acq-RQ4 
Acq-RQ5 
Acq-RQ6 
“Does leaving the device turned on has an impact on its 
integrity?” (RQ4) 
 
When turned on, GPS devices keep trying to obtain a GPX fix, in 
order to synchronize their clock and be ready to navigate. This 
information can be stored in its RAM or its internal memory. This 
behaviour has been noticed on Tom-Tom devices, and reported 
by several studies (C. Colombini, 2009; LeMere & Sayers, 2009; 
Nutter, 2008), it is assumed that such behaviour may be found on 
Garmin devices as well. 
 
“Does leaving the device turned on away from GPS signals has 
an impact on its integrity?” (RQ5) 
 
LeMere reports that using a faraday bag or cage can prevent this 
kind of behaviour, as the GPS fix is never obtained, thus 
preventing the device from updating the data (LeMere & Sayers, 
2009). This should be similar in Garmin devices. 
 
“Does leaving the device turned on connected to a computer has 
an impact on its integrity?” (RQ6) 
 
Nutter reports another way to prevent a Tom-Tom device from 
trying to get a GPS fix, by connecting the aforementioned device 
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to a computer. The device will use “mass storage mode” in which 
it does not use its locational features. The hypothesis is that 
Garmin devices may act the same. 
Acq-RQ7 “What forensic imaging tools can be used to efficiently acquire 
Garmin devices?” 
 
Apart from the device’s behaviour, another key component to 
consider is the acquisition tool itself. Most of the literature 
investigating Tom-Tom devices use FTK Imager, or the “dd” 
command (C. Colombini, 2009; Jones et al., 2008; LeMere & 
Sayers, 2009; Nutter, 2008). However, no evaluation has been 
done specifically for GPS devices. 
Acq-RQ8 “Is there a way to image the device, without making a USB 
connection?” 
 
As pointed out by the RQ3 defined earlier on, connecting the 
device through USB might have an impact on its integrity. In 
order to prevent any alteration, it is important to evaluate other 
possibilities to image the device.  
 
3.3.2 Experiments 
The core objective previously defined is a guiding thread to the design of the 
experiments. The RQs divide this objective into smaller questions, ensuring 
the test set is as exhaustive as possible. The result of this design is a set of 
three experiments, addressing the eight RQs formerly introduced. Each of 
these experiments will be carried out on the “Garmin set”, the devices 
described in Section 3.2. 
 
3.3.2.1 Experiment n°1: Evaluation of forensic imagers 
RQs related: Acq-RQ7 
This first experiment aims to evaluate the most popular imaging tools when 
dealing with Garmin devices. Each tool has to image the Garmin set, and 
will be evaluated on the successfulness of its copy and its execution speed. 
The tools considered for this experiments are as below: 
 FTK Imager v 3.1.4.6 – AccessData 
 EnCase Forensic Imager v 7.09.00.111 – Guidance Software 
 GUYMAGER v 0.7.1-1 – Caine 5.0 Live CD 
 “dd” command – Caine 5.0 Live CD 
The experiments will be carried out on the following computer: 
Table 3 Computer used for experiment n°1 
PC Notebook  
Alexandre Arbelet Page 43 
 
Model Lenovo T420s 
OS Windows 7 SP1 32bits 
RAM 4.00 GB 
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2620 @ 2.70GHz 
Storage SSD 160 GB 
 
The following metrics are taken into account for the evaluation of the tools: 
 Successfulness of the copy (cryptographically verifiable) 
 Execution speed 
3.3.2.2 Experiment n°2: Boot with another OS 
RQs related: Acq-RQ8 
As it has been remarked by Nutter (2008), connecting a GPS device to a 
computer may result in a timestamp being updated somewhere in the 
memory. This behaviour is due to the operating system present inside the 
device. To prevent this, van Eijk & Roeloffs (2010) made a Tom-Tom device 
boot with another operating system, specifically crafted to access and copy 
the RAM. This is possible because Tom-Tom devices boot in priority on the 
SD Card, and then on their internal memory. The present experiment aims 
to assess whether or not such technique is possible on Garmin devices. To 
do so, a similar experiment to the one conducted by van Eijk & Roeloffs 
(2010) is designed, involving the following steps: 
1. Select a lightweight Linux distribution. 
2. Create a bootable SD card. 
3. Copy the Linux distribution onto the SD card. 
4. Assess whether or not the device try to boot from the SD card. 
This experiment differs a bit of the original experiment in that the 
distribution does not aim to copy any of the data. Nevertheless, making the 
device avoiding its original bootloader, even if the experiment results in an 
error, represents a proof of concept that could be the subject of further 
research.   
3.3.2.3 Experiment n°3: Timestamps analysis 
RQs related: Acq-RQ1, Acq-RQ2, Acq-RQ3, Acq-RQ4, Acq-RQ5, and Acq-
RQ6 
As mentioned earlier, manipulating GPS devices may result in timestamps 
being written somewhere in the memory. Knowing the consequences of an 
action carried out on a device is paramount for a digital investigator. This 
experiment has for goal to pinpoint the timestamps being written for a given 
action.  The experiment will use a PC Notebook running Kali Linux and the 
SleuthKit (TheSleuthKit, 2014). 
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Table 4 Computer used for experiment n°4 
PC Notebook  
Model Lenovo T420 
OS Kali Linux 
RAM 4.00 GB 
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2620 @ 2.70GHz 
Storage HDD 500GB 
 
The experiment consists in performing a set of actions at a known time, and 
then looks for timestamps updates. The procedure is as follow, at least 5 
minutes should separate each steps of the procedure: 
1. Turn on the device – note the time (t1). 
2. Connect the device to the computer – note the time (t2). 
3. Using the SleuthKit, look for timestamps updates at times T1 and T2. 
4. Disconnect the device – note the time (t3) 
5. Power off the device – note the time (t4) 
6. Connect the device (still turned off), the device should turned on by 
itself once connected – note the time (t5) 
7. Using the SleuthKit, look for timestamps updates at times T3, T4 and 
T5. 
8. Disconnect the device and restart it – note the time (t6) 
9. Wait 20 minutes with the device close to a window 
10. Connect the device – note the time (t7) 
11. Using the SleuthKit, look for timestamps update between t6 and t7. 
12. Redo steps 8 to 11, with the device protected from GPS signals. 
13. Wait 20 minutes with the device connected 
14. Note the time (t8) – Using the SleuthKit look for timestamps updates 
between t7 and t8. 
3.4 Analysis 
When investigating a device, the “Analysis” stage is far less critical than the 
“Acquisition”, as the work is mainly done on copies. However, it remains 
nevertheless the core stage where evidence is found and carved out of the 
memory. As memory can nowadays reach huge proportions, even in small 
scale embedded systems such as GPS devices, one must be aware of its 
internal structure and what eventual data can be found, in order to search 
in the right direction (Harrill & Mislan, 2007; Strawn, 2009). As highlighted 
by the literature review, few studies document the internal structure of 
Garmin devices.  
The aim of this section is to investigate the file system architecture of 
Garmin devices, locate where the valuable information is held and evaluate 
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the different means to carve it out of the memory. Just as standard computer 
forensics, the recovery of deleted files must also be taken into account. The 
section is divided into two sub-sections, the first defines a set of research 
questions to be addresses, and the second one the experiments assessing 
those latter.  
3.4.1 Research problems 
As for the acquisition, the research problems related to analysis are driven 
by a main objective being the optimization of the analysis process. The 
architecture of the file system will be investigated, and the tools performing 
the analysis evaluated. Additionally, some specific features present in 
Garmin devices can very valuable data for an investigator. For instance, the 
“Triplog” feature, per default in the majority of recent Garmin devices, 
allows the device to track the user, even though he is not using it consciously. 
The RQs are defined to monitor that the experiments stay on track regarding 
the main objective. These RQs are related to three main subjects of 
investigation; the location of the file of interests within the device, the 
reminiscence of this data on the device, and the traces left by the Triplog 
feature. The Table 5 below details these RQs.  
Core objective: “Optimize the analysis process on Garmin navigation 
systems, to retrieve as much evidence as it is possible, within a short lapse 
of time”. 
Table 5 RQs related to the Analysis process 
Code Research problems 
Ana-RQ1 
Ana-RQ2 
Ana-RQ3 
Ana-RQ4 
Ana-RQ5 
Ana-RQ6 
Ana-RQ7 
“Where does the device store: 
 The home address of the user? (RQ1) 
 The route he has taken? (RQ2) 
 The favourite locations he stored (waypoints)? (RQ3) 
 The previous searches done on the device? (RQ4) 
 The itineraries computed by the device? (RQ5) 
 The information produced by the Triplog (RQ7)” 
 
This first RQ aims at pinpointing the valuable information within 
the device. In their study, C. M. Colombini et al., (2012) listed the 
information stored on GPS devices that may be of interest for an 
investigator. This list has been used in conjunction with another 
study published by Hannay (2008), in which he pin-pointed the 
location records on a Tom-Tom device. The hypothesis is that 
Garmin devices hold similar information in a similar structure. 
Ana-RQ8 
Ana-RQ9 
“What is the structure of these files (RQ8) and what tools can be 
used to make them readable by humans (RQ9)?” 
 
Once the location of the information within the files known, it is 
important to consider how the data can be easily read by an 
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investigator. The structure known can also help recover deleted 
data, which is the objective of the next RQ. 
Ana-RQ10 “How volatile is the information held by Garmin devices?” 
 
Alike other devices, the data held in GPS devices can be lost, 
deleted by the system to free some space. Being able to recover 
these files can be of paramount importance, as remarked by a 
representative of the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit in Scotland 
(NHTCUS), in an interview conducted on the 14 July 2014. This 
RQ aims to assess the data reminiscence on Garmin devices, and 
the efficiency of well-known forensic tools in performing this task. 
 
3.4.2 Experiments 
The two experiments described below have been designed accordingly to the 
eleven RQs formerly introduced. The RQs help to define the scope of the 
experimentation. Experiments are carried out on the Garmin set described 
in Section 3.2. 
3.4.2.1 Experiment n°4: Locating forensic artefacts 
RQs related: Ana -RQ1, Ana -RQ2, Ana -RQ3, Ana -RQ4, Ana -RQ5, Ana -
RQ6, and Ana-RQ7. 
This first experiment aims to pinpoint where the data of interest might be 
located on the device. As each piece of information listed above in the RQs 
is the result of an interaction between the user and the device, it is possible 
to interact in a way making the information easier to locate (e.g. Home 
address somewhere in China).   
Concerning the experiment, it has to be noted that the three devices will 
follow the same steps, with different configurations: 
 Nüvi 1340 
 Nüvi 2515 – Triplog feature disabled 
 Nüvi 2595 – Triplog feature enabled 
The first part of the procedure follows the same steps than Hannay's study 
(2008): 
1. Display current location, and note the coordinates with the 
reference device. 
2. Navigate without reaching the destination. 
3. Navigate and reach destination. 
4. Navigate and move in opposite direction. 
5. Navigate with the device in sleep mode. 
6. Search without enabling navigation. 
7. Create favourite location. 
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In order to address all the RQs, additional steps will also be carried out: 
8. Search for POIs 
9. Save a favourite destination 
10. Set the home address. 
The second phase then intend to recover the data with the SleuthKit and 
Autopsy. Once recovered, the details and the structure of the files containing 
valuable information will be documented In order to validate the data 
acquired, a Nüvi 2595 will be used as reference. 
3.4.2.2 Experiment n°5: Deleted files recovery 
RQs related: Ana -RQ11 
Devices are likely to hold more information than they seem to, deleted files 
may hold very valuable information and can sometimes be recovered, 
depending on the underlying technology. As no metadata entry exists for 
these files, one must know the inner-structure of a file to recover it. The 
previous experiment defined the headers and trailers of the file of interests, 
information that can be used to carve eventual deleted files out of the 
memory. This experiment aims to assess the data reminiscence on Garmin 
devices and the tools that can be used to extract the information. The scope 
of this experiment is limited the locational data. 
The tools evaluated as part of this experiment are: 
 Windows explorer (acting as a reference) 
 Autopsy 
 EnCase 
 Scalpel 
 Foremost 
 
The procedure is as follow: 
1. Attempt to extract deleted files from the memory. 
2. Calculate a hash of these files and compare them to the files 
discovered using the windows explorer. 
3. Document the older file (containing locational data) found on the 
device. 
3.5 Anti-forensics 
Anti-forensics is a controversial topic amongst the forensics community. 
Whereas academics such as Lallie & Benford, (2011) and Strawn, (2009) 
tend to warn the community about the risks of anti-forensics on locational 
data, practitioners argue that this menace is highly unlikely to happened, as 
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criminals do not have the technical background to perform such 
manipulations (Ball, 2008). This opinion seems to be shared by several 
professional working in the field, as observed by a NHTCUS representative, 
interviewed the 15 July 2014. According to him, criminals will more likely 
send someone with their GPS whilst they are committing a crime rather than 
travel with the device and then manipulate the data to justify their alibi. 
Despite this difference of opinion, anti-forensics are on the rise, and must 
be consider as a potential threat (Sartin, 2006). It is important to 
understand what action can be done on these devices in order not to be 
caught by surprise if anti-forensics were to grow wider in GPS devices in a 
near future.  
3.5.1 Research problems 
Anti-forensics is a broad subject, defined by Garfinkel as “a growing 
collection of tools and techniques that frustrate forensic tools, investigations 
and investigators” (S. Garfinkel, 2007). Inside GPS devices, it can be found 
under multiple form, from stenographic data embedded into files, to data 
simply wiped out of the memory (Sartin, 2006). Concerning the present 
study, the scope of the research problems is narrowed to the modification of 
locational data only. These problems are defined following a core objective:  
“Assessing the ways in which an attacker could modify the data held in 
Garmin devices in a way it could mislead an investigator” 
This induces three RQs, aiming to address the main objective, described in 
the Table 6 below. These RQs have been inspired from a study published by 
Lallie & Benford, (2011), in which they modified the locational data inside 
pictures, before uploading the pictures back in the IPhone they were 
belonging to. 
Table 6 RQs related to Anti-forensics 
Code Research problems 
Ant-RQ1 “Can the content of a file be modified on a device, without having 
an impact on the timestamps?” 
 
As pointed out by Ball, (2008), a location associated with a 
timestamp can be of crucial importance in an investigation. 
Inversely, being able to modify this data to mislead an 
investigator to a false alibi can be paramount for a criminal, and 
lead to an injustice. 
Ant-RQ2 “Can the timestamp of a file be modified without leaving any 
traces?” 
 
When accessing a device with a computer, timestamps may be 
updated in the process (Nutter, 2008), a criminal might be able 
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to revert these using anti-forensic techniques, in order to cover 
his tracks. 
 
3.5.2 Experiments 
This subsection presents the experimentation related to anti-forensics. A set 
of three experiments, designed accordingly to the related RQs has been 
designed. These experiments do not rely upon the model of the device. 
Therefore, only one device from the Garmin set will be considered, the 
Garmin Nüvi 2515LM. 
3.5.2.1 Experiment n°6: File’s content alteration 
RQs related: Ant-RQ2 
This experiment aims to modify the content of the device memory without 
updating any timestamps. The hypothesis is that if the file is modified at a 
byte level, not at a file system level, timestamps will not be updated. To 
verify this assumption, the following experiment has been designed, 
composed of the following steps: 
1. With the SleuthKit, localize the geolocation of the favourite “Garmin 
Scotland”. 
2. Modify the data in a way the new coordinates points to Edinburgh. 
3. Verify the information on the device has been correctly updated. 
3.5.2.2 Experiment n°7: Timestamp alteration 
RQs related: Ant-RQ3 
Although the aim of this experiment is different, the procedure is similar to 
the experiment n°9. As mentioned earlier, connecting the device to a 
computer, or simply turning it on might have a repercussion on certain 
timestamps. This experiment aims to show it is possible to revert these 
changes. The procedure is as follow: 
1. With the SleuthKit, localize where the updated timestamp is stored. 
2. Modify the data in a way it shows a data a week before the original. 
3. With the SleuthKit, verify the timestamp has correctly been updated. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter described the experiments that have been designed to 
investigate Garmin devices’ based on the literature reviewed in the previous 
chapter, highlighting the lack of work in the area. Three types of tests have 
been designed, aiming to investigate the acquisition, analysis and anti-
forensic techniques respectively. Conducting these experiments should 
address a range of research questions, which would provide a better 
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understanding of the devices’ structure and behaviour, and help 
investigators to handle them. 
The first set of experiments, related to forensic acquisition, aims to evaluate 
the well-known imaging tools when dealing with Garmin devices, and 
provide a better understanding on the device specific behaviours that could 
have an impact on the investigation. 
The second set aims to investigate the file structure and the data 
reminiscence of Garmin devices. As this kind of experimentation has been 
regularly used in studies addressing Tom-Tom devices (C. Colombini, 2009; 
Hannay, 2008; Nutter, 2008), the results gathered in these experiments will 
have a point of comparison on Tom-Tom devices. 
The third and last set aims to assess the possibility for one to mislead an 
investigator by manipulating the data held on a device. The three 
experiments target the content as well as the timestamps, hence 
investigating the possibility for someone to create compelling evidence or 
alibis for themselves.  
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Chapter 4 Experimentation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents how the experiments previously designed have 
been conducted, and summarizes the results obtained. Just like the previous 
chapter, it is divided into three sections, dedicated to the categories the 
experiments belong to, respectively “Acquisition”, “Analysis”, and “Anti-
forensics”. Each experiment has its own sub-section, in which a summary of 
the procedure carried out is explained, along with the processed results. Full 
procedures are detailed in the Appendices when relevant.  
4.2 Acquisition 
4.2.1 Experiment n°1: Evaluation of forensic imagers. 
The experiment intended to evaluate the performance of well-known 
forensic imagers when dealing with Garmin devices. To do so, the three 
devices from the Garmin set have been imaged on PCA, using four different 
tools; FTK Imager, EnCase Forensic Imager, Guymager and the Linux “dd” 
command. About the acquisition procedure itself, it has proven to be easier 
on Linux than Windows. 
When handling the experiment with Linux, every devices have been imaged 
simply by connecting the device to the computer, and then selecting the 
device amongst a list (for Guymager) or in the “/dev/” folder (for the dd 
command). Full acquisition procedures under Linux are detailed in 
Appendix E (Guymager) and Appendix F (dd). 
Inversely, using windows-based tools FTK and EnCase, only the Garmin 
Nüvi 1340 could have been acquired at a first time. Garmin Nüvi 2515 and 
2595 were detected by the computer, but did not appeared in the device list 
of the tools. After some research, it appears that this difference is due to the 
use of different protocol to communicate with the device (Garmin, 2014c). 
In fact, the Nüvi 1340 uses “USB mass storage device class” (USB MSC) to 
communicate with the computer (Sandisk, 2013). The device will therefore 
be seen as a “Mass storage device” by the OS, see Figure 32. Conversely, 
more recent Garmin devices such as the Nüvi 2515 and the Nüvi 2595 tested 
tend to use Media Transfer Protocol (MTP), which makes the device being 
recognized as a “Portable Device” (c.f. Figure 33). MTP is a protocol 
designed by Microsoft to facilitate media synchronization between 
Windows and portable devices such as MP3 players (Sandisk, 2013). When 
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using MTP, Windows does not mount the device, and it is therefore 
impossible to access it with the forensic tools considered for this 
experiment. 
 
Figure 32 Garmin Nüvi 1340 in windows 
 
Figure 33 Garmin Nüvi 2595 in windows 
 
It has been possible to image successfully the devices by updating the driver 
software, thus making them being recognized as mass storage devices. The 
procedure has been inspired by a similar procedure done on MP3 players 
(Taylor, 2011), and is described in Appendix G.  
The procedure also showed that EnCase were able to acquire the RAM of the 
device, whereas FTK, dd, and Guymager could not access it. 
Whilst acquiring the devices, the execution times have been measured. As 
shown in Figure 34 below, the measurements show equivalent performance 
between the tools. The choice of the tool therefore does not have an impact 
on the performance of the acquisition. 
 
Figure 34 Execution time of forensic imaging tools Versus Garmin devices 
However, the generation of the device might have an impact. As shown in 
the Figure 34, the acquisition of the Garmin Nüvi 1340, took twice the time 
needed to acquire the Garmin Nüvi 2595, yet two times bigger. This is 
because the Nüvi 13xx generation uses USB 1.1, whereas Nüvi 25xx 
generation uses USB 2.0. 
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4.2.2 Experiment n°2: Boot with another OS. 
Tom-Tom devices boot on the SD card in priority (van Eijk & Roeloffs, 
2010). Such characteristics can allow an investigator to make the device 
boot on a custom OS designed to copy the content of the memory, hence 
bypassing the internal OS and avoiding the USB connection. The present 
experiment aimed to evaluate the presence of this characteristic within 
Garmin devices. 
All the devices from the Garmin set accept Micro SD card. The first phase of 
the experiment was therefore to create a bootable SD card, with a 
lightweight Linux distribution on it. This has been done by using the 
freeware “Win 32 Disk Imager” (see Figure 35 below).  
 
Figure 35 Win 32 Disk Imager 
The software allows to image portable devices such as USB drives or SD 
Cards, and inversely, to write back images on devices. An “Arch Linux” 
image was written on the SD card. Although there is no documentation on 
the matter, it has been assumed that Garmin devices were running ARM 
processor, hence the choice of the image.  
The experiment has then been conducted on the devices of the Garmin set. 
No change has been noticed, and all the devices considered used their 
original boot sequence. These results can have two significations. First, the 
device did not consider the presence of the SD card to perform its boot 
sequence, and therefore followed its casual sequence by booting on its 
internal memory. Second, the boot from the SD Card was unsuccessful, and 
because of that, the device did boot on its internal memory instead. 
Although none of these hypotheses can be invalidated, the boot sequence 
was performed as usual without additional time (which would have 
explained a boot failure), hence making the first supposition more likely. 
It can therefore be reasonably assumed that Garmin devices do not boot 
uppermost on their SD card.   
4.2.3 Experiment n°3: Timestamps analysis. 
This experiment intended to identify actions an investigator is susceptible 
to make and would result in an alteration of the device. The procedure 
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designed in the section 0 has been followed and resulted in a better 
understanding of Garmin devices’ behaviour. 
Six different case studies were tested, among which four of them were 
conclusive. The results show that turning off a device, or leaving it on, 
connected to a computer does not affect its integrity in any way. However, 
timestamps are updated every time a device is turned on (Table 7), or 
connected to a computer (Table 9 and Table 10).  
 
Table 7 Timestamps updated when turning on Garmin devices 
Path Type Modified Accessed Created 
/Garmin/GarminDevice.xml file X  X 
/Garmin/GarminDevice.tmp file (deleted) X  X 
 
The Table 7 above summarizes the timestamps that have been updated by 
turning on the device. As shown in the Figure 36 below, a temporary file 
called “GarminDevice.tmp” is created, and helps to the creation of another 
file called “GarminDevice.xml”. The temporary file is then deleted. As no 
traces of any timestamps have been found within those files, another 
experiment has been conducted, aiming to highlight the differences between 
two versions of this file by comparing their MD5 hash. This showed these 
two files do not change, but are re-created every time the device is turned 
on.  
 
Figure 36 Files created when device is turned on 
 
Table 8 Timestamps updated when turning off Garmin devices 
Path Type Modified Accessed Created 
/Garmin/Diag/GarminOS.log file X   
 
When turning the device off, the device logs the event in a file called 
“GarminOS.log”, as shown in the Figure 37 below.  
 
Figure 37 Content of the file GarminOS.log 
 
Table 9 Timestamps updated when connecting Garmin devices to a computer under Linux 
Path Type Modified Accessed Created 
/GPX/Current.gpx file X X  
/GPX/Position.gpx file (deleted) X  X 
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When the device is connected to the computer under Linux (Table 9), two 
files appear to have been altered. A temporary file, called “Position.gpx”, 
and another file called “Current.gpx” (see Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38 File modified when connecting the device to a computer 
The time at which the device is put into USB mode is stored in a temporary 
file containing (if possible) the Last known position. This file is called 
“Position.gpx”; gpx standing for GPS eXchange format, a lightweight XML 
format dedicated to the interexchange of GPS data (Topografix, 2004). The 
file is structured as a XML, and the node “time” contains the date at which 
the device has been into USB mode (see Figure 39). 
 
Figure 39 Position.gpx 
The file “Current.gpx” is updated with the information held by 
“Position.gpx” (see Figure 40), and remains on the device. 
 
Figure 40 Current.gpx 
 
Table 10 Timestamps updated when connecting Garmin devices to a computer under Windows 
Path Type Modified Accessed Created 
/GPX/Current.gpx file X X  
/GPX/Position.gpx file (deleted) X  X 
Every files on the device file  X  
 
However, as pointed out by Table 10 above, when connecting the device to 
Windows systems, if the investigator does not use any write-blocker, the 
“Accessed Timestamps” of every file present on the device will be updated 
(see Figure 41 below). 
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Figure 41 Files accessed under windows systems 
In order to prevent this, a manipulation is nevertheless possible for those 
who do not have a physical write-blocker with them. To do so, one must edit 
the Windows registry as shown in the Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42 Write-protect policy in windows registry 
 
This manipulation will make windows consider storage devices as read-
only, thus preserving the original timestamps. 
Two case studies however do not provide enough results to draw any 
conclusions: Leaving the device on, with and without protection against GPS 
signals. The experiment was to turn on a device, wait a certain amount of 
time before connecting it to a computer and look if any timestamps had been 
updated in between. This experiment had however a limitation; if the 
information collected during this period of time is stored in the same file as 
the time at which the device has been connected, the modification would be 
hidden by the timestamp update related to the USB connection. Further 
investigation will therefore be needed. 
4.3 Analysis 
4.3.1 Experiment n°4: Locating forensic artefacts. 
Similar to other embedded devices, Garmin GPS systems have their own 
data hierarchy. This experiment aims to document this by interacting with 
the device in a way could highlight where the evidence is likely to be found 
within all the information. 
The procedure described in section 3.4.2 highlighted several files holding 
valuable information. These files are listed in the Table 11 below and will be 
Alexandre Arbelet Page 57 
 
documented thereafter. In order to pinpoint these files, the SleuthKit-based 
software “Autopsy”, for windows, has been used. When conducting the 
experiment, the time has been noted for every step. Then, using autopsy, the 
files recovered have been sorted regarding their last modification time, 
hence highlighting the impact of the experiment of the device. 
Table 11 Files of interest and information held inside them. 
File of interest Data 
/GPX/Current.gpx Last USB connection. 
Home address. 
Favourite locations. 
Last trips coordinates. 
/GPX/Archive/ Folder containing trips archives 
(.gpx extension). 
/.System/GtmData.tmp* Last connection to the network to 
get traffic updates. 
/.System/Logs/searches.txt* 
Searches (POIs) /.System/SQLite/recent_searches.db* 
/.System/SQLite/quick_search_list.db* 
/.System/SQLite/user_strings.db* Destinations entered. 
/.System/SQLite/RecentStops.db* Recent stops made by the user. 
 
* Garmin Nüvi 25xx only 
4.3.1.1 Current.gpx and the Archive folder 
From a forensics point of view, “Current.gpx” is one of the most important 
files that can be found within Garmin devices, as it holds very useful data to 
investigators. As showed in the Table 11 above, “Current.gpx” holds the 
favourite locations of the user, as well as its recent whereabouts if the 
Triplog feature is enabled. This file is typically found under in the “/GPX” 
folder on Garmin devices except ones from the Nüvi 200, 300, 600 and 700 
series (Garmin, 2014b). As mentioned in Table 11, this is where the device 
stores the favourite locations of the user, its home address, and sometimes 
records its movements. 
This file also uses the GPX format. The simple structure of this file makes it 
relatively easy to investigate, and humanly understandable. To read it, the 
easiest way is to drag and drop the file in an internet browser, such as Google 
Chrome (Google Inc., 2014a) or Firefox (Mozilla, 2014), to access the raw 
data in a readable way (see Figure 43). Documentation on the gpx structure 
can be found on the website of the company Topographix, responsible of the 
format (Topografix, 2004). 
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Figure 43 Current.gpx within Chrome 
The structure of this file, found within every Garmin devices is as the 
following: 
<gpx>  Opening tag of the file.  
   
 <metadata>…</metadata> Metadata: Section containing the time when 
the device has last been connected to a 
computer. 
   
 <wpt>…</wpt> Waypoints: Contains home address and 
favourite locations. 
 <wpt>…</wpt> 
 … 
   
 <trk>…</trk> Tracks: Contains where the user has been at 
a given time.  
 <trk>…</trk> 
 … 
   
</gpx>  Closing tag of the file. 
 
To extract locational data and present them on a map, the gpx file can simply 
be opened with Google Earth (Google Inc., 2014b). Doing so will make the 
analysis easier as it will draw the trips done by the user on a map and 
highlights the POIs (Figure 44). 
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Figure 44 Current.gpx in Google Earth 
Additionally, the “/GPX” folder holds another folder, called “Archive” in 
which are stored historic locational data. Through this file, on a device used 
on a weekly basis, it has been possible to recover trips that have been done 
a year earlier. 
The experiment also highlighted the presence of a DB, in which are stored 
the recent stops the user has made. As shown in Figure 45, the DB stores the 
coordinates of the stop, along with a timestamp and a textual description. 
Although such information can be deduced from the timed-location 
recovered in “Current.gpx”, it nevertheless might be of interest as it could 
draw the attention of an investigator on a potentially suspicious activity.  
 
Figure 45 RecentStops.db content 
The experiment also pointed out the presence of a temporary file called 
“GtmData.tmp”. This file, recovered by Autopsy, contains the last time the 
device has been connected to the radio network to receive traffic updates.  
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4.3.1.2 Data issued from user interaction (Nüvi 2515 and 2595)  
On recent Garmin devices, such as the Nüvi 25xx series, it is possible to 
recover data that resulted from an interaction with the user, such as the 
searches he has done, or the keywords he has entered.  
The experiment conducted to the discovery of a file called “searches.txt” 
located inside “/.System /Logs/”. This file contains what the user has been 
searching, as well as the nearby proposition computed by the device (see 
Figure 46). 
 
Figure 46 Searches.txt on a Nüvi 2595 
Recent Garmin devices use DBs used for internal purposes. These latter can 
also hold information and therefore potentially cross correlate an evidence. 
During the experiment, these DBs have been accessed with SQLite Database 
Browser (Piacentini & Morgan, 2012). 
Searching for a POI makes the device update two of these DBs; 
“quick_search_list.db” and “recent_searches.db”, which are used as a 
cache to reduce the response time on next similar inquiries (fork(), 2013). 
Entering an address also has its repercussions in the DBs, more precisely on 
“user_strinb.db”. As its name suggests, this DB contains the strings that 
have been typed by the user. As shown in Figure 47, this concerns mainly 
addresses and postcodes. However, phone numbers can also be found 
amongst the data. 
 
Figure 47 user_strinb.db content 
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4.3.1.3  Information recovered within the devices considered. 
This sub-section resumes what information has been recovered on the 
different devices from the Garmin set. The Garmin set is made of three 
devices, belonging to two different series (Nüvi 13xx and Nüvi 25xx). On the 
Nüvi 2515, the Triplog feature has been disabled, in order to see the impact 
of turning on/off such feature on the data recovery process. 
For each of the devices, the information recovered has been synthetized into 
two tables, the first one related to information resulting from a Human-
Machine Interaction (HMI), and the second one to data produced by the 
device whilst under experimentations. 
Nüvi 13xx: 
Unlike more recent devices such as the Nüvi 25xx series, the Nüvi 1340 does 
not have any log folder or DBs. As underlined by the Table 12 below, the only 
information related to HIM has been recovered through the “Current.gpx” 
file. 
Table 12 HMI information on Nüvi 1340 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Address 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Textual 
description 
accurate 
Enter an address and enable navigation no no no N/A 
Search w/o enabling navigation no no no N/A 
Search and enable navigation no no no N/A 
Create favourite location yes yes no yes 
Set home address yes yes no yes 
 
However, the Triplog feature, present in this model (Garmin, 2014b), 
provides the investigator with valuable information related to where the 
user has been, even though he did not follow the navigation. The Table 13 
below shows that the use of this feature (enabled by default) makes the user 
being tracked at all time. However, given that no information related to the 
destination could have been retrieved within the memory, there is no way to 
know if the plotted destination has been reached or not. 
Table 13 Locational information on Nüvi 1340 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Path of 
movement 
known 
Known if 
destination 
reached. 
“View map” mode yes yes yes N/A 
Nav without reaching destination yes yes yes no 
Nav and reach destination yes yes yes no 
Nav and move in opposite direction yes yes yes no 
Sleep mode no no no N/A 
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Nüvi 2515 (25xx Triplog disabled): 
In order to assess the impact of turning on/off the Triplog feature on data 
retrieval, the feature has been disabled on one of the device of the 25xx 
series, the Nüvi 2515. As previously mentioned, recent Garmin series do 
have DBs embedded, aiming to reduce the search time and therefore 
enhance the user experience. The Table 14 below highlights what 
information valuable to investigators can be retrieved within these DBs. It 
has to be noted that DBs such as “quick_search_list.db” or “user_strinb.db” 
do store timestamps along with the raw information, which can be 
paramount when investigating a large amount of data. 
Table 14 HMI information on Nüvi 2515 (Triplog disabled) 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Address 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Textual 
description 
accurate 
Enter an address and enable navigation no yes yes N/A 
Search w/o enabling navigation no no no N/A 
Search and enable navigation no yes yes N/A 
Create favourite location yes yes no yes 
Set home address yes yes no yes 
 
Table 15 give prominence to the repercussions engendered by disabling the 
Triplog feature. Once the feature disabled, no information is stored inside 
the memory. As the scope of this study does not cover the RAM, this latter 
has not been investigated, but such information is likely to be found in the 
RAM, which therefore should be further investigated. 
Table 15 Locational information on Nüvi 2515 (Triplog disabled) 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Path of 
movement 
known 
Known if 
destination 
reached. 
“View map” mode no no no no 
Nav without reaching destination no no no no 
Nav and reach destination no no no no 
Nav and move in opposite direction no no no no 
Sleep mode no no no no 
   
Nüvi 2595 (25xx Triplog enabled): 
In this experiment, the Nüvi 2595 represents the 25xx series, with the 
Triplog feature enabled. As it can be seen in TA below, the feature does not 
have any impact on the databases, in which the same information previously 
discovered could have been retrieved. 
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Table 16 HMI information on Nüvi 2595 (Triplog enabled) 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Address 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Textual 
description 
accurate 
Enter an address and enable navigation no yes yes N/A 
Search w/o enabling navigation no yes no N/A 
Search and enable navigation no yes yes N/A 
Create favourite location yes yes no yes 
Set home address yes yes no yes 
 
However, when it comes to locational data, having the Triplog enabled 
allows investigators to recover a great deal of information (see Table 17). By 
cross correlating the location where the user has been and the searches he 
has done, the investigator can easily deduce if the user reached the 
destination he was aiming towards.   
Table 17 Locational information on Nüvi 2595 (Triplog enabled) 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Path of 
movement 
known 
Known if 
destination 
reached. 
“View map” mode yes yes yes N/A 
Nav without reaching destination yes yes yes yes 
Nav and reach destination yes yes yes yes 
Nav and move in opposite direction yes yes yes yes 
Sleep mode no no no no 
 
An additional experiment has been carried out, aiming to see whether 
disabling the Triplog whilst driving would have a visible impact or not. The 
Figure 48 presents the result of this last experiment. The signal acquisition 
has been represented in red, then the vehicle has been driving using the map 
display, without any navigation. The Triplog has then been disabled, and no 
further locational data could have been recovered past this action. 
 
Figure 48 Triplog disabled whilst driving 
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4.3.2 Experiment n°5: Deleted files recovery. 
The last experiment underlined the value of “Current.gpx” for a digital 
forensic examiner. As stated by Garmin, only a restricted amount of data 
can be held in the memory. The firm reports up to 10’000 points per file and 
a maximum of 20 files per devices, stored inside the “/GPX/Archive” folder 
(Garmin, 2014b). This present experiment aimed to investigation the actual 
data retention of Garmin systems, as it is known that a file deleted at the OS 
level may remain within the memory for much longer.   
“.gpx” files contains mainly waypoints – such as the user’s home address or 
favourite locations – and tracks, which are where the user has actually been 
with the device. The Archive folder contains up to 20 of these files, named 
with a number, incremented each time. The lower the number is, the older 
the file. Incidentally, in a folder containing 20 files named 6.gpx to 25.gpx, 
it can be deduced that five files have already been deleted at the OS level. 
Whilst it is still possible to recover part of the memory, the usage of flash 
memory makes the recovery difficult, as underlined in the section 2.3.1. In 
order to recover the most of the data, the recovery has been attempted at 
two different levels. The first one is to recover the whole .gpx file, containing 
waypoints and tracks. The second is to retrieve these data separately. Three 
different methods have been used to recover the data. The file browser aims 
to underline what could be retrieved by simply navigating through the 
folders of the device. The “fls” command represents what a basic forensic 
investigation might extract, with deleted files recovery. “Scalpel” is a tool 
used to carve data out of the memory. Given appropriate header and trailer, 
“Scalpel” can retrieve part of a file that no longer exists in its entirety. The 
configuration files used for the carving procedure can be found in Appendix 
H, and the results are detailed in the Table 18 below.  
 
Table 18 Information retrieval depending on the recovery technique. 
Data Device Archive Files name File browser fls Scalpel 
.gpx files Nüvi 1340 [44.gpx – 63.gpx] 22 23 26 
Nüvi 2515 [7.gpx – 26.gpx] 22 23 26 
Nüvi 2595 [26.gpx – 45.gpx] 21 22 22 
Total 
waypoints 
Nüvi 1340 -- 11 11 19 
Nüvi 2515 -- 5 5 5 
Nüvi 2595 -- 7 7 7 
Total 
tracks 
Nüvi 1340 -- 1965 1965 1992 
Nüvi 2515 -- 232 232 294 
Nüvi 2595 -- 2107 2107 2192 
 
As shown in the Table 18 above, carving files based on their header and 
trailers seems to be the more efficient method to extract the most data out 
of a device. The results will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
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Once carved, .gpx files can be directly read by software such as Google Earth 
(Google Inc., 2014b). Regarding the waypoints and tracks, as shown on 
Figure 49 and Figure 50, the carving process recovers them as GPX entities, 
and therefore only needs to be encompassed by opening and closing gpx tags 
“<gpx></gpx>” to be open by the same kind of software.  
 
Figure 49 Structure of a recovered track 
 
Figure 50 Structure of a recovered waypoint 
 
This process of adding gpx tags to view the data recovered is a process that 
could be easily automated. Once this manipulation done, the information 
can be read through Google Earth, as shown in the Figure 51 and Figure 52 
below. 
 
Figure 51 recovered track in Google Earth 
 
Figure 52 recovered waypoint in Google Earth 
 
4.4 Anti-forensics 
4.4.1 Experiment n°6: File content alteration. 
Be able to retrieve evidence is paramount to digital investigators, however, 
techniques to counter forensics exists, and could be used by criminals in 
order to create an alibi or create an inculpatory evidence on someone else’s 
device. This experiment shows how information inside Garmin devices can 
be manipulated in a way it could mislead an investigator, without leaving 
any traces on the timestamps. The goal is therefore to modify a location 
stored on the device, by manipulating its latitude or longitude. 
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Since there is no results but the procedure itself, this latter will be detailed 
and explained below. The procedure has been carried out on a Garmin Nüvi 
2515, using a computer running Kali Linux and using the SleuthKit to access 
and manipulate the data. Due to the amount of data the commands can 
produce, the output has been reduced to the relevant data only. The full 
procedure with more detailed outputs can be found in Appendix I. 
First thing is to pin-point where the data is located on the device, at a byte 
level. Using the SleuthKit, more precisely the “fls” and the “istat” command, 
one is able to locate the blocks containing the information. 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 
[...] 
d/d 22: GPX 
[...] 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 22 
[...] 
d/d 32113800: Archive 
[...] 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 32113800 
[...] 
r/r 32139308: 60.gpx 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 32139308 
[...] 
Name: 60.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written: Wed Dec 4 08:07:06 2013 
Accessed: Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970 
Created: Thu Nov 28 19:38:18 2013 
 
Sectors: 
2070136 2070137 2070138 2070139 2070140 2070141 2070142 2070143... 
 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=512 skip=2070137 count=1 | xxd 
[...] 
0000130: 3c74 726b 7365 673e 3c74 726b 7074 206c <trkseg><trkpt l 
0000140: 6174 3d22 3531 2e33 3834 3136 3422 206c at="51.384164" l 
[...] 
 
Once the targeted information pin-pointed, it is possible to modify it. Piping 
the Linux “echo” command into a “dd” command is a way to access the byte 
without needing any additional tools. 
$echo -ne "\x34"| dd of=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN seek=1059910468  
bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
1 byte (1 B) copied, 0.000260159 s, 3.8 kB/s 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=512 skip=2070137 count=1 | xxd 
[...] 
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0000130: 3c74 726b 7365 673e 3c74 726b 7074 206c <trkseg><trkpt l 
0000140: 6174 3d22 3431 2e33 3834 3136 3422 206c at="41.384164" l 
[...] 
 
The command above shows the modification has been applied on the 
latitude, changing the value from “51” to “41”. 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 32139308 
[...] 
Name: 60.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written: Wed Dec 4 08:07:06 2013 
Accessed: Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970 
Created: Thu Nov 28 19:38:18 2013 
[...] 
 
These commands did not affect nor modify any timestamps. Thus, it is 
possible to access the device at a byte level and bypass any logging that could 
take place at an OS level.  
Even though the experiment modified only one targeted byte through 
several commands, such process can be automated and turned into a 
software dedicated to GPS anti-forensics, thus making the process easier 
and accessible to non-technical people. 
4.4.2 Experiment n°7: Timestamps alteration. 
As it has been shown throughout the previous experiments, recent Garmin 
devices tend to log most of the user interactions with the device. This being, 
an investigator could rely upon those pieces of information to make its 
investigation progress. Although it can of precious help, the following 
experiment try to send a warning to the forensic community, not to rely 
blindly upon timestamps that might have been reverted or manipulated at 
some time. 
The procedure that has been carried out is very similar to the previous 
experiment. Instead of altering the data, the metadata are modified, hence 
making it possible to revert timestamps unwillingly modified at a first time. 
The procedure has been carried out on a Garmin Nüvi 2595, using a 
computer running Kali Linux and the SleuthKit to access and manipulate 
the data. The full procedure with the detailed outcomes can be found in 
Appendix J.  
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 
[...] 
d/d 21: GPX 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 21 
d/d 171155846:    Archive 
r/r * 171155848:    Position.gpx 
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r/r 171155850:    Current.gpx 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 171155850 | head 
[...] 
Name: CURRENT.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written:    Wed Jul 23 12:03:10 2014 
Accessed:    Tue May 27 00:00:00 2014 
Created:    Sat Sep 28 10:36:32 2013 
 
Instead of altering the content of a file, the aim is to modify its metadata. 
This information can be found in the sectors dedicated to its parent folder. 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 21 
[...] 
Name: GPX 
Sectors: 
10711992 10711993 10711994 10711995 10711996 10711997 10711998 
10711999 
The modification process is a basic “echo” command piped into the “dd” 
command. 
$echo -ne "\xf0" | dd of=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN seek=5484540146 
bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
1 byte (1 B) copied, 8.9676e-05 s, 11.2 kB/s 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 171155850 | head 
[...] 
Name: CURRENT.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written:    Wed Jul 16 12:03:10 2014 
Accessed:    Wed Jul 16 00:00:00 2014 
Created:    Sat Sep 28 10:36:32 2013 
The command above shows the modification has been done successfully, 
and assesses therefore the possibility for one to have the complete control 
of the information present on such devices. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, seven experiments have been successfully carried out on a 
sample of three Garmin devices from two different generations. Among 
these experiments, the three firsts were related to the acquisition process. 
The results collected show that the efficiency of acquisition does not depend 
of the tool being used to perform such procedure.  
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On the question of the device’s behaviour, the results suggest that turning 
on/off or connecting the device to a computer does have an impact on its 
logical integrity. An investigator willing to conduct an investigation 
involving Garmin devices must be aware of this, otherwise he may leave 
traces on the evidence. Moreover, it has been discovered that connecting a 
Garmin device to a computer running Windows, without the use of any 
write-blocker or write-protect policy, results in all the file’s accessed 
timestamp being updated at the day of connection.  
Then, two experiments investigated what could be retrieved on Garmin 
devices, where it could be stored and how long is it likely to remain in the 
memory. These experiments permitted to highlight the structure of the file 
system used by Garmin devices, and assessed how long valuable data may 
remain on the device before being deleted (at an OS level), or totally erased 
of the memory. Using the structure of the information discovered, it has 
been possible to define hexadecimal headers and footers for two artefacts of 
significant value to investigators: favourite locations (i.e. waypoints) and 
position of the user over time (tracks). The headers and footers designed 
have then been used to carve out a significant amount of useful data, which 
could not be retrieved by the deleted file recovery feature of Autopsy. 
The last category of experiment was about purposely manipulating the data 
without leaving traces on the device. These experiments have been 
conducted successfully, in which both timestamps and locational data could 
have been manipulated. The successfulness of such experiment warns not 
to blindly rely upon such data without the evidence been cross-correlated. 
The experiments have been conducted and their results collected. The next 
chapter discuss these results and assess the experimentation process itself.  
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Chapter 5 Discussions 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and evaluates the raw results obtained through the 
experiments conducted in Chapter 4. These results are then compared 
against those of similar studies. It also takes a global view over the different 
experiments to answer the objectives of the present thesis. The chapter is 
divided into three sections, being respectively related to forensic 
acquisition, analysis and evidence admissibility. 
 The first sections synthetize the main findings about the behaviour of 
Garmin devices during the acquisition process. It highlights how the device 
might log the interactions with the user and gives directions how to acquire 
the data with minimum impact on the device. It also reports on the 
effectiveness of the different acquisition tools used to image the memory. 
The second section describes the most interesting pieces of information that 
can be recovered on a Garmin device. The location of these artefacts within 
the files is documented, and their reminiscence in the memory evaluated. 
This part also compares the evidence that can be recovered on Garmin and 
Tom-Tom devices.  
The final section concerns anti-forensics and describes what manipulations 
can be expected on Garmin devices. It first presents the results of the 
experiments conducted in Chapter 4 and evaluates them against other work. 
The results are compared to those obtained by Lallie & Benford, (2011), 
which demonstrates successful alteration of locational data held in pictures 
of IPhone devices. The implications of anti-forensics are then discussed, 
taking into account both practitioners and researchers viewpoints. 
5.2 Forensic acquisition of the device 
As stated before, forensic acquisition is considered as a paramount phase in 
forensic investigations (Carrier, 2005). Regardless of the brand, studies 
dealing with GPS devices tend to describe how they performed their 
procedure, but often do not consider how the device might react to it (C. M. 
Colombini et al., 2012; C. Colombini, 2009; Hannay, 2008; Jones et al., 
2008; Lemere & Sayers, 2009; Strawn, 2009). From the literature reviewed, 
Nutter (2008) has been the one of the very few to consider how the 
acquisition procedure might have an impact on the device’s memory. 
Regarding Garmin devices, the research material was extremely limited. A 
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blog article investigated the timing data contained in the temporary file 
“Position.gpx”, but did not investigate where the timestamp was coming 
from and simply concluded it was the time the device had been turned on 
(fork(), 2013). The experiments conducted in Chapter 4 aimed to investigate 
this behaviour and the method to acquire the device efficiently in a 
forensically sound manner. These experiments have been carried out 
successfully and provided several outcomes. 
5.2.1 Acquisition performance 
The first experiment aimed to assess the different acquisition tools when 
dealing with Garmin devices. The results showed the acquisition 
performance depends on the device itself, and not the tool used to perform 
the acquisition. Indeed, the acquisition time measured was very similar 
from a tool to another. However, big differences have been noticed when 
imaging a device belonging to an older generation. This is due to the use of 
different version of USB from one series to another, whilst Nüvi 25xx 
devices use USB 2.0, Nüvi 13xx devices are still using USB 1.0, hence making 
then imaging process longer. Recent devices also use MTP and therefore are 
not recognized by windows-based forensic software without changing the 
driver to make them being considered as Mass Storage Device instead.  
Concerning the tools, Linux-based tools Guymager and the “dd” command 
have revealed themselves as being less invasive when used “out of the box”. 
Indeed, without the use of a write blocker, or a write protect policy, 
connecting the device through USB results in updating the accessed 
timestamps of every file present of the device. However, if enough measures 
have been taken, tools are similar, although EnCase remains the only one 
that can access the RAM, yet outside the scope of this thesis. 
5.2.2 Garmin logging system 
The second and third experiments aimed to document the behaviour of 
Garmin devices during the imaging process. The results show that every 
interaction between the user and the device is being logged or at least has 
an impact on timestamps. The following Table 19 summarized files 
impacted when acquiring Garmin devices. 
Table 19 Timestamps updated during the imaging process 
Device is turned on Device is turned off Device is connected via USB 
/Garmin/GarminDevice.xml 
/Garmin/GarminDevice.tmp 
/Garmin/Diag/GarminOS.log /GPX/Current.gpx 
/GPX/Position.gpx 
 
These steps however need to be done to image the device. Since the OS of 
the device is responsible for this logging scheme, a solution could be to 
bypass it to acquire the memory. In their study on Tom-Tom devices, van 
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Eijk & Roeloffs (2010) noticed that if a bootable SD Card were present in the 
device when starting, this latter would boot on the SD card in priority rather 
than booting on its internal memory. Assumptions were made that Garmin 
devices would act the same, but the experiment carried out denied this 
hypothesis. Another way to prevent the OS to alter the data is to physically 
access the memory, using JTAG test connectors on the CPU (I. M. F. 
Breeuwsma, 2006; van Eijk & Roeloffs, 2010), however, as the hardware 
analysis of the devices goes beyond the scope of this study, this path has not 
been considered. Future studies on the matter should consider this option. 
Two levels of experimentation are possible; the first one is to dismantle the 
device and note the CPU used, then look at the CPU specifications to see 
whether it has such port or not. The second goes further and aims to 
reproduce the experiment conducted by van Eijk & Roeloffs (2010), in which 
they successfully imaged the entirety of the memory through this port.  
Other options exist, such as using software exploits to make the device boot 
on another OS, as suggested by Rabaiotti & Hargreaves (2010), or through 
Bluetooth or infrared as mentioned by Fiorillo (2009), however, such 
techniques can be hard to perform and therefore might not be worth 
investigating. 
The interview conducted with an NHTCUS representative Mike Dickson, 
and forensic practitioner, highlighted a gap between forensics as considered 
by the research community, and the “in the field” reality. According to him, 
techniques such as boundary scanning via JTAG are typically not worth 
considering as they are hard to carry and therefore too expensive to be used 
at a large scale. If there is no other means to carry out the imaging process, 
then the evidence, although it has been altered, is still valid in court. 
However, investigators must be aware of what can be altered by their 
manipulations on the device.  
5.3 Forensic analysis and file of interests 
With the growing size of today’s hard drives, having a structured 
investigation procedure is paramount to recover the relevant information in 
a short lapse of time. To do so, it is important to be aware of internal 
structure of the information, where the relevant data is stored, and how it is 
possible to access the most of it. Most the literature addressing Garmin files 
of interests reviewed considered “Current.gpx” has being the most 
important file held within the device (C. M. Colombini et al., 2012; Jones et 
al., 2008). Although, this might be true, it is yet far of being the only one. A 
blog article went a bit further and listed some of the file where valuable data 
could be contained, without going into depth about what exactly could be 
retrieved (fork(), 2013). The experiments carried out in section 4.3 have 
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been of great value to pinpoint the location of valuable forensic information, 
summarized in the Figure 53 below. It has to be noted that only locational 
data have been taken into consideration for this study, which means other 
folders might contain valuable information as well, such as call or text 
messages emitted and received on the device providing Bluetooth pairing. 
These artefacts can also be of great value to an investigator as they may 
contain evidence of communication between the suspect and its accomplice 
(C. M. Colombini et al., 2012; Lemere & Sayers, 2009). Such artefacts 
should therefore be addressed by further research.  
 
Figure 53 File structure in a Garmin Nüvi 2595 
As shown in the figure above, new generations of devices log more 
information than before. The main difference noticed between the 13xx and 
the 25xx generations is the presence of databases recording the interactions 
a user has had with the device. These databases provide investigators with 
a lot of user-related information, which can be used along with digital 
profiling techniques to create the behavioural profile of a user. 
Moreover, these experiments underlined under which conditions the data 
was collected by the device. Hannay, (2008) published a study in which he 
conducted a similar experiment on Tom-Tom devices. Depending of the 
mode of operation of the device, Hannay has been able to retrieve historic 
location data (see Figure 54). However, this data is issued by the route 
computation of the device, not its movement. As no information is stored, 
indicating whether the destination has been reached or not, it is therefore 
impossible to know, with certainty, where the user has actually been. 
Another study conducted by Nutter, (2008) on similar devices showed that 
no timestamps were stored along with the locational information. Because 
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Tom-Tom devices do not log the real-time position of the user, no 
timestamps need to be stored in memory. They are, just as the current 
location of the user, processed in the RAM, behaviour highlighted by van 
Eijk & Roeloffs, (2010) study, which discovered those timestamps whilst 
analysing the data contained by the volatile memory.  
 
Figure 54 Operational Modes of Tom-Tom devices and recoverable information (Hannay, 2008) 
Unlike Tom-Tom devices, Garmin devices store the actual position of the 
device, rather than the route that has been computed. The Table 20 shows 
the information recovered from a Garmin Nüvi 2595, depending on its 
operational mode.  
Table 20 Locational information on Nüvi 2595 (Triplog enabled) 
Operational mode Coordinates 
retrieved 
Timestamps 
retrieved 
Path of 
movement 
known 
Known if 
destination 
reached. 
“View map” mode yes yes yes N/A 
Nav without reaching destination yes yes yes yes 
Nav and reach destination yes yes yes yes 
Nav and move in opposite direction yes yes yes yes 
Sleep mode no no no no 
 
As highlighted by the results in Table 20, the Triplog feature introduced by 
Garmin in most of its products allows recovering very accurate and timed 
information on the position of a user at a given time. Full movement path 
have been recovered, even though no navigation had been set. This 
characteristic belonging to Garmin devices makes them real asset for 
investigations. However, few experiments have been conducted whilst the 
device was in sleep mode, and it has been noticed that sometimes, even with 
the device in sleep mode, locational data was still recorded by the feature. 
This behaviour has been noticed by Lehr, (2010), although his study did not 
deeply investigate this question either. Based on observations made during 
the experiments, the hypothesis is that the device will keep logging its 
position – even in sleep mode – until he has lost the GPS signal. In this 
particular case, a device in sleep mode will not try to get the signal back, 
whereas a device navigating or in map mode would. As this behaviour is not 
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yet fully understood, further research should be conducted, including a 
wider range of devices. 
Regarding data reminiscence on Garmin devices, the experiments 
conducted showed that an investigator were more likely to recover the most 
of the information by taking into account the unallocated clusters of the 
memory as well. Locational data can be carved out of the memory quite 
easily, given their XML structure. As shown in the Figure 55, Figure 56, and 
Figure 57, the results suggest that carving smaller pieces of information than 
entire GPX file have been shown to be more effective, as the bigger the 
chunk of data, the more likely for it to be corrupt. Data recovery via carving 
has showed to be more efficient than other techniques.  
With regards to the recovery of entire gpx file, the experiment showed that 
carving the information based on known header and trailer were more 
efficient than relying on standard forensic tools such as Autopsy (using fls). 
The Figure 55 below shows the results of this experiment and highlights that 
more data were extracted with scalpel, than through the “fls” command or 
the file browser.   
 
Figure 55 GPX File recovery 
When considering waypoints (see Figure 56), substantially more data was 
recovered on the Nüvi 1340. However, the number of waypoints recovered 
was the same for each recovery method attempted, on every other device. 
This might be the result of waypoints being deleted by the user, still held 
within the unallocated cluster of the Nüvi 1340. 
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Figure 56 Waypoints recovery 
Tracks are ordered lists of locational data forming a path (Topografix, 
2004). As they contain the exact location of the device – and by extension 
its user – has been, tracks are of paramount value to investigators (Nutter, 
2008). Figure 57 below shows the tracks retrieved depending of the recovery 
technique. Again, more data was extracted using carving methods than 
other techniques. 
 
Figure 57 Tracks recovery 
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, archive files are named incrementally 
over time. By correlating this to the results, it can be inferred that the 
additional .gpx files recovered with Scalpel use to be part of the archive, and 
has been deleted. For instance, carving files with scalpel permitted the 
retrieval of three more files than when using the “fls” command on the Nüvi 
1340. It can therefore be inferred that those three files are likely to be part 
of the 44 files that have been deleted on the device. The next Table 21 
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resumes the number of additional .gpx files that have been recovered with 
scalpel, and compares these numbers to the mileage of their respective 
devices (expressed by the archive lowest name). 
Table 21 Recovery percentages 
Device 
Files 
recovered 
with scalpel 
Files 
recovered 
with fls 
Archive’s 
lowest name 
Percentage of 
additional file 
retrieved 
Deleted file 
recovery 
percentage 
Nüvi 
1340 
26 23 44.gpx 13.0% 6.8% 
Nüvi 
2515 
26 23 7.gpx 13.0% 42.8% 
Nüvi 
2595 
22 22 26.gpx 0% 0% 
 
The percentages above did not provide any further information; however, 
the same experiment should be conducted on a larger set of devices in order 
to draw conclusions. Nevertheless, it seems that the amount of data 
recovered remains around three to four files, regardless of the device’s 
mileage. It has to be noticed that no files could have been recovered on the 
Nüvi 2595 device. As numerous deleted tracks were recovered on this same 
device, it is assumed that file corruption at the header and trailer level might 
be responsible. However, this assumption can only be asserted by 
conducting the same experiment on a larger set of devices. 
5.4 Admissibility of locational evidences 
As claimed by Ball, (2008), locational data constitutes an asset of great value 
for investigations. Despite known inaccuracies, GPS data is still widely used 
as a lead, or evidence in a court of law (Hubbard, 2008). 
Two experiments have been conducted, described in section 4.4, aiming at 
demonstrating how locational data could easily be manipulated without 
leaving any traces an investigator could notice. By accessing the memory at 
a Byte level, one is able to manipulate the memory, without altering any 
timestamps (See Figure 58).  
  
Figure 58 Original locational data versus modified data 
Moreover, if any timestamps were to be modified in the process, the same 
technique could revert the timestamps, thus preventing anyone to discover 
the manipulation through the timestamps (see Figure 59).  
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Figure 59 Original timestamp versus modified timestamp 
Another experiment conducted by Lallie & Benford, (2011), aimed also at 
challenging the reliability of locational data contained within pictures on 
iPhones. As a result, they showed it was possible to modify such data 
contained within pictures without leaving any traces. This means a criminal 
could modify the data in a way it could mislead an investigator, or create an 
alibi for himself.  
Typically in the real world, practitioners do not believe the criminals to have 
the knowledge to perform such manipulations (Dickson, 2014). As claimed 
by Ball, (2008), “The criminal genius is a creature of comic books and 
movies”, thought which seem to be shared by NHTCUS representative Mike 
Dickson. In his interview, M. Dickson reported from experience that 
criminals would behave differently; “They would send someone else driving 
around with their device rather than manipulating the data inside it”. 
However, M. Dickson acknowledged the need for the forensics community 
to be aware of the anti-forensics possibility.  
Although anti-forensics is a quite controversial subject among the forensic 
community, it should not be ignored. The fact that criminals do not use 
these tools does not mean they will not one day.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the main findings issued by the experiments, and 
compared them against other studies, reviewed in Chapter 2. Several 
outcomes have emerged from these discussions. 
On the question of forensic acquisition for Garmin devices, this study 
showed the importance of considering the device’s behaviour in the 
acquisition process, as it may have an impact on the integrity of the system. 
These results are similar to those observed by Nutter (2008) which 
documented timestamps being modified when imaging Tom-Tom devices. 
To prevent this, investigators must circumvent the OS and its inherent 
logging system. Several techniques investigated in this study might address 
this problem, however, as remarked by Dickson (2014), they would be too 
expensive to be considered on a daily basis. 
The experimentation also permitted to locate several files containing timed 
locational data that could be of interest to investigators. Further research 
showed that this data was issued by the Triplog feature and the locational 
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data recovered was in fact the whereabouts of the GPS device’s owner. These 
results were compared against similar studies on Tom-Tom devices, in 
which the only locational data found was generated by the route 
computation, not by the movement of the device (Hannay, 2008; Lemere & 
Sayers, 2009; Nutter, 2008). About locational data, this study shows that 
Garmin devices have a greater forensic potential than Tom-Tom devices, as 
the coordinates retrieved assess an actual location where the user has been. 
This thesis also evaluates the reminiscence of locational data post-deletion. 
As stated by Garmin (Garmin, 2014b), only a limited amount of data is kept 
inside the device. Using specific headers and footers discovered during the 
experimentation, the data has been carved out of the unallocated clusters. 
The results were very conclusive, as a large amount of data could have been 
recovered. With comparison to other techniques such as the deleted file 
recovery feature of EnCase or Autopsy, the experiment showed that carving 
was more efficient, although the experiment should be conducted on a 
larger sample to draw conclusions. 
The experiments also highlighted that Garmin devices were prone to anti-
forensic techniques. Indeed, it is possible for one to manipulate every bit of 
information on the memory, without leaving traces nor updating 
timestamps. Although this raises concerns amongst the research 
community (Lallie & Benford, 2011; Strawn, 2009), forensic practitioners 
believe that criminals are typically not skilled enough to use such 
techniques. This also opens an interesting question, which could be 
addressed by further research.   
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Overall conclusion 
This thesis aimed to explore the forensic potential of Garmin navigation 
devices, and assess the reliability of the information, which may reside on 
them. As very few studies about Garmin devices were published at the time 
of writing, studies about similar devices such as Tom-Tom products have 
been used as a base of comparison. The project tackles three areas, 
respectively forensic acquisition, analysis and anti-forensics. For every one 
of them, both theoretical and practical aspects were considered. Through 
the literature reviewed and the experiments conducted, several conclusions 
can be drawn. 
The acquisition process of such devices requires knowledge of the device, 
and its behaviour. Interacting with Garmin devices alters their memory, as 
the device logs every HMI. For instance, the system logs the time at which 
the device has been turned on/off, has been connected to a computer 
through USB or has been connected to the traffic receiver. A way to prevent 
this happening would be to bypass the OS, but this option is unfortunately 
too expensive to be used on a regular basis. 
Unlike Tom-Tom devices, which store the routes the device has computed, 
the locational data contained inside Garmin devices can show where the 
device has actually been. Additionally, it has been discovered that the 
devices hold timestamps in their non-volatile memory has well, thus 
allowing an investigator to track where a suspect has been within a given 
timeframe.  
Locational data remains on the device in an archive folder, which, according 
to Garmin, can contain up to 20 files, each containing up to 10000 
coordinates. When this threshold is reached, the device deletes the older 
files. This thesis however showed that it was possible to carve out in average 
four to five additional files, regardless of the size of the memory, and 
regardless of the device’s mileage. 
New generation Garmin systems have databases embedded inside them, 
logging HMIs such as searches, text entered and POIs. Although such 
information does not always have timestamps associated, it can still be used 
to establish the behavioural profile of a user. 
 
Alexandre Arbelet Page 81 
 
 
Investigators must remain careful when dealing with such data, and cross 
correlate every evidence that can be found the device. Indeed, as 
demonstrated through the experiments of this project, everything on the 
device can be manipulated without leaving any traces. Although such 
practices are not common amongst current criminal society, it does not 
mean it will not be.  
6.2 Appraisal of achievements 
At the beginning of this project, four objectives have been defined: 
1. From the literature, review the principles and limitations of the 
Global Positioning System, and how this technology is used 
nowadays. Investigate how GPS forensic investigations are 
performed, regarding to a specific brand such as Tom-Tom or 
Garmin. 
2. Based on the findings of the literature review, design a set of 
experiments aiming to assess forensic acquisition and analysis of 
Garmin systems, and challenge the reliability of the evidence 
retrieved.  
3. Implement the experiments and document the main steps in order to 
make them reproducible. Collect the raw results. 
4. Discuss and evaluate the results, by comparing them to similar 
studies conducted by the community. 
6.2.1 Objective n°1 
The first objective has been achieved and reported in Chapter 2. The first 
aim of the literature review was to provide a background knowledge to the 
reader. Although most of GPS forensics studies introduces their research by 
describing GPS principles, it has been found that most of these were vague. 
In order to remain rigorous in the terms and principles, the very basics of 
GPS were studied from Parkinson, (1997) who was the original GPS 
program director. 
Concerning GPS forensics, the literature is mainly focused on Tom-Tom 
devices, and rarely addresses Garmin devices. Amongst the few studies 
investigating Garmin devices, the devices considered were old devices, not 
in use at the time of writing. These devices did not provide the investigator 
with any data of interest. The first hypothesis for this lack of interest 
towards Garmin devices was therefore that those were not storing any data 
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of interest, therefore being pointless to investigators. Mike Dickson, a 
forensic practitioner, remarked that in fact, the vast majority of devices were 
Tom-Tom devices, therefore explaining this lack of interest from the 
forensic community (Dickson, 2014). However, he also acknowledged such 
devices should be documented, as well as the procedure needed to 
investigate them. 
The review of GPS limitations highlighted a concern within the forensic 
community, about locational data being inaccurate and prone to 
manipulation. Although this concern is generally mentioned as something 
to be aware of, little research have actually been carried on GPS anti-
forensics. The closest similar study was an experiment conducted by Lallie 
& Benford, (2011), in which pictures were extracted from an IPhone, their 
locational data were modified and the picture were putted back in the 
device. During their experiment they did not modified any timestamps that 
could assess the modification. This study then inspired part of this study, 
dedicated to locational anti-forensics on Garmin devices. 
6.2.2 Objective n°2 
The second objective was met by the creation of a set of experiment, aiming 
to investigate the different forensic methods, and the artefacts recovered. 
This objective is reported in Chapter 3. Those experiments have been 
divided into three categories. In total, seven experiments were designed, 
based on Research questions issued from the literature and personal 
reflections. 
The three firsts are related to forensic acquisition and intends to evaluate 
tools and methods that can be used to acquire the memory inside Garmin 
devices. The literature reviewed also showed that interaction between the 
user and the device were likely to be log by the OS of the device. As such, 
characteristic might influence the logical integrity of the system. An 
experiment has been designed accordingly in order to document which 
interaction was likely to be logged, and what impact it would have on the 
memory.  
Two experiments are then related to forensic analysis, focused on where 
data of interest might be hold, and for how long it is likely to remain on the 
memory. In order to evaluate the reminiscence of the data on the memory, 
the structure of the files must be known, in order to carve them out of the 
unallocated clusters, based on their header and trailer. The successfulness 
of the first experiment has therefore a direct impact on the success of the 
second. 
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The last two experiments are related to anti-forensics and investigate 
whether Garmin devices are prone to anti-forensic techniques or not. In 
order to evaluate this. The targeted data needs to be accessed at a byte level, 
hence preventing the OS to update any timestamps. 
6.2.3 Objective n°3 
The third objective, reported in Chapter 4, was to conduct the set designed 
as second objective. All experiments were conducted successfully and 
provided some very interesting results. These latter were collected and 
permitted to highlight several outcomes. 
On the question of forensic acquisition, the tools were evaluated based on 
their execution time. The results collected show that every tools considered 
in the experiment were equivalent by the minute. The performance of the 
acquisition therefore does not rely upon the tool used.  
The experimentation also enumerated cases where the device logged events 
inside its memory. On this matter, it has been shown that turning on/off a 
Garmin device, or connecting it to a computer results in the memory of the 
device being altered. The experiment permitted to pinpoint the files 
containing the log entries. Moreover, is has been shown that a connection 
to a windows machine without the use of a write-blocker, lead to all the files 
“accessed timestamp” being updated. To prevent this, this thesis proposes a 
manipulation of the Microsoft Registry, aiming to set up a write-protect 
policy. 
For the purpose of artefact location, three Garmin devices were carried 
when traveling with a car around Edinburgh. The procedure tried to 
consider as mush case study as possible, beginning with those described in 
Nutter, (2008). This experiment permitted to recover most of location 
where the user has been, apart from when the device was in sleep mode. 
Concerning the literature formerly reviewed, this experiment had never 
been carried out on Garmin devices before. Results can nevertheless be 
compared to those obtained on similar devices such as Tom-Tom, which has 
been done in the Chapter 5. 
Before this project, no study seemed to have documented the reminiscence 
of locational data within a GPS device, nor the best methods to recover 
deleted information. The experiment conducted discovered it was possible 
to recover more information than with the standard forensic tools by 
carving the information, based on fixed headers and footers. It has also be 
demonstrated that for the carving process to be more efficient, the smallest 
entity of information should be considered. In the case of this study, the 
information about where the user has been is contained in a “.gpx” file, 
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which contains a set of “tracks” – each track being a set of timed-coordinates 
composing the journey of a user – and waypoints – being the user’s favourite 
locations. By carving tracks and waypoints rather than “.gpx” files, the 
information is less likely to be corrupted. However, the experiment should 
be conducted on a larger sample to draw conclusions. 
The last experiment being conducted aimed to assess the possibility of anti-
forensics techniques on Garmin devices. As this type of experiment had not 
been conducted on GPS devices, the procedure was inspired by a study on 
IPhone pictures’ geo-tag reliability. All the procedure were carried out 
successfully, meaning Garmin devices were prone to anti-forensic 
techniques.  
6.2.4 Objective n°4 
The fourth objective has been met by the discussion of the results occurring 
in Chapter 5, which was drawing the outcomes of this project, by correlating 
the results obtained and the literature formerly reviewed. The discussion 
also permitted to regroup the different outcomes and address the leading 
goal of this project, which was exploring forensic methods applicable to 
Garmin devices, and document locational artefacts located on them.  
Comparing the results obtained through experimentation to those obtained 
in similar studies permitted to highlights the main contributions of this 
study, which is of use to many practitioners.  
Regarding acquisition practices, the current work listed the interactions 
investigators are likely to have with the device, which results in timestamps 
being modified. This information makes investigators aware of their 
repercussions when acquiring Garmin devices, and can help them to decide 
whether to conduct the acquisition or not.  
On the question of locational artefacts, the study recovered timed locational 
data, permitted investigators to investigate up to 6 month of a suspect’s 
whereabouts. This is of paramount value to investigators, especially as Tom-
Tom devices do not hold such data and are only able to provide computed 
routes. Moreover, the data recovered through carving into the unallocated 
clusters might expand this period. However, the data recovered within 
unallocated clusters has not been dated. 
Anti-forensics is an interesting area, where the research community and 
practitioners are strongly in disagree on the sociologic aspect of the 
question, being whether or not a criminal would use such techniques. 
However, about the possibility of anti-forensics, this thesis clearly 
demonstrated that such techniques were possible on Garmin devices, and 
were undeniably prone to be automated. 
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6.3 Future work 
In order to help forensic examiners to handle Garmin forensics successfully, 
more research is needed. 
The scope of the present study was limited to locational artefacts. However, 
the literature reviewed showed other information related to the user were 
likely to be found on such devices. As these devices are more and more 
considered as mass storage devices, investigators can expect the same data 
that can be found on a standard personal computer. Moreover, the features 
offered by these devices to connect user’s smartphones may lead to the 
recovery of data belonging to the cell phone, inside the GPS. 
The use of NAND-based flash memory inside GPS devices has been 
mentioned, however, its impact on the data reminiscence has not been 
evaluated. This would be a good area to research, as it has been 
demonstrated that wear levelling and garbage-collection mechanisms do 
have an impact on forensics investigations.  
As it has been previously mentioned, the behaviour of the Triplog feature 
whist the device is in sleep mode should be subject to further 
experimentation. Although this thesis addressed partially this case study, 
the results whilst driving with the device in sleep mode where inconsistent. 
Sometimes the device would record the location for hours, whereas during 
other experiments, the logging would stop as soon as the device enters the 
mode. 
Other memory should be investigated, such as the RAM, or the GPS chips 
itself. It has been proven that RAM inside Tom-Tom devices contains 
valuable information such as timestamps. Garmin may hold also a great deal 
of information within volatile memory. 
Concerning acquisition methods, more experiments should be conducted. 
In order to assess the possibility to acquire Garmin devices through JTAG 
boundary scanning, it would be interesting to dismantle the device and 
compare the reference of the CPU to verify the presence of a JTAG port. 
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Appendix A Initial Project Proposal 
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Appendix B Project management 
Gant chart: 
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Project diaries: 
 
  
Alexandre Arbelet Page 100 
 
 
  
Alexandre Arbelet Page 101 
 
 
  
Alexandre Arbelet Page 102 
 
Appendix C FTK Acquisition 
This annexe details the procedure to image a Garmin device 1  with FTK 
Imager. FTK Imager is a freeware distributed by Access Data. The tool can 
be downloaded here. 
1. Connect the device to the computer. The device will then entered a "mass 
storage mode", the progression is reported by a green loading bar. 
  
 
2. Wait for the device to have the 
opposite display. It means the 
device is in "mass storage mode". 
Open FTK Imager. 
 
 
3. Click “File”. In the menu, click 
on “Create Disk Image…”, as 
shown below. 
 
 
                                                   
1 The device considered for this procedure is a Garmin Nüvi 1340. 
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4. When the window opens, select 
“Physical Drive”, and then click 
on “Next >”. 
 
 
5. You are then invited to select 
the drive you want to image. 
Select the one containing 
“Garmin nüvi Flash USB” 2 , 
and then click “Finish”. 
6. When the window opens, click 
on “Add…”. 
 
 
7. Select “Raw (dd)” to get a raw 
image or the device, or another 
format. Then click on “Next >”. 
                                                   
2 If the Garmin device does not appear in the list, please refer to the Appendix G, on how to 
mount recent Garmin devices as mass storage devices. 
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8. Fill the different fields, and click 
on “Next >”. 
 
 
9. Select where to store the image, 
and give it a name. In order to 
have a single file, put “0” in the 
“Image Fragment Size (MB)” 
field. Click on “Finish”. 
10. Click on “Start” 
 
 
11. The device is being acquired. 
 
12. Once the acquisition is done, two files appears in the target folder; the 
image itself (extension .001), and the acquisition report (extension 
.001.txt).  
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Appendix D EnCase Acquisition 
This annexe details the procedure to image a Garmin device3 with EnCase 
Forensic Imager. EnCase Forensic Imager is a freeware distributed by 
Guidance Software. The tool can be downloaded here. 
1. Connect the device to the 
computer and wait the device to 
be in “mass storage mode”. 
Open EnCase Forensic Imager. 
 
 
2. Click on “Add Local Device”. 
 
3.   
Deselect all the 
options if not using 
a tableau write 
blocker. Then click 
“Next >”. 
 
 
                                                   
3 The device considered for this procedure is a Garmin Nüvi 2515LM. 
Alexandre Arbelet Page 106 
 
 
4.   
Select the drive allocated 
to the Garmin device 4 , 
then click “finish”. 
 
 
5.   
Select the device, then 
click on “Open”. 
 
 
 
6.   
Select the device, then click 
on “Acquire…”. 
 
 
 
7.   
Fill the information then click on 
the “Format” tab. 
 
 
                                                   
4 If the Garmin device does not appear in the list, please refer to the Appendix G, on how to 
mount recent Garmin devices as mass storage devices. 
Alexandre Arbelet Page 107 
 
 
8.   
Choose the “Evidence file format”, 
disable the “Compression”, and 
set the “File Segment Size” to a 
value superior to the device 
memory size in order to obtain a 
single file. Then click on “OK”. 
 
9. The device is being acquired 
 
 
 
10. Once acquired, the image can be found in the target folder.  
 
 
 
 
11.   
To get a feedback on the 
acquisition process, 
click on “view”. Then 
select “Console”. 
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Appendix E Guymager Acquisition 
This annexe details the procedure to image a Garmin device 5  with 
Guymager. Guymager is an open source project embedded into Linux 
versions dedicated to penetration testing (e.g. Kali Linux or Backtrack) and 
forensics (e.g. Caine). The webpage for this tool can be found here. 
 
1.  
Connect the device to the computer 
and wait the device to be in “mass 
storage mode”. Open Guymager. 
 
 
 
2.    
Right click on the 
Garmin device. 
 
3.   
Click on “Acquire 
image”. 
 
 
 
                                                   
5 The device considered for this procedure is a Garmin Nüvi 2515LM. 
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4.   
Select the file format, 
disable the option “Split 
image file” to get a single 
file. Fill the directory, the 
name, and then click on 
“Start”. 
 
 
 
5. The image is being acquired. 
 
 
6. Once the acquisition process is done, two files are produced, the image 
itself (extension .dd) and the acquisition report (extension .info). 
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Appendix F “dd” Acquisition 
This annexe details the procedure to image a Garmin device6 with the Linux 
“dd” command. “dd” is a command on Unix which is used to copy and 
convert files. The command is available on every Linux-based distributions. 
Documentation can be found here. 
1. First thing is to locate the device. 
ls –R /dev | grep –i –b2 garmin 
 
2. Then run the dd command. 
dd if=/dev/by-label/GARMIN of=Desktop/2515.dd 
 
3. Once the acquisition done, a single file is created. 
  
                                                   
6 The device considered for this procedure is a Garmin Nüvi 2515LM. 
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Appendix G Garmin device with MSC 
This appendix describes the procedure to mount recent Garmin devices as 
mass storage devices instead of portable devices, thus allowing forensic 
imager such FTK or EnCase to access the internal memory. This procedure 
considers windows7 as the underlying OS, as Linux does not use MTP to 
communicate with the devices. 
1. Initial situation: 
 
2.   
Open the “Start” menu, right-
click on “Computer” then select 
“Properties”. 
 
 
 
3.   
When the “System” window 
opens, select “Device Manager”. 
 
                                                   
7 The present procedure has been carried out using Windows 7. 
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4.   
Search for the Garmin device then 
right-click on it. Select “Update 
Driver Software…” 
 
 
 
5.   
When the window opens, select 
“Browse my computer for driver 
software”. 
6.   
Select “Let me pick from a list of 
device drivers on my computer”. 
 
 
7.   
Select “USB Mass Storage Device” 
then click “Next” 
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8.   
The new driver is being installed. 
 
 
 
9.   
Once the procedure done, the device is accessible as a mass storage device, 
and therefore can be image by EnCase and FTK. 
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Appendix H Carving procedure 
GPX file carving: 
Configuration: 
# GPX Files 
 gpx y 5000000 <gpx\x20xmlns=” </gpx> 
 
Command: 
scalpel –b –c gpx_carving.conf –o output_folder image.dd 
 
Waypoint carving: 
Configuration: 
# Waypoints 
 wpt y 500000 <wpt\x20lat=" </wpt> 
 
Command: 
scalpel –b –c wpt_carving.conf –o output_folder image.dd 
 
Track carving: 
Configuration: 
# Tracks 
 trk y 500000 <trk>  </trk> 
 
Command: 
scalpel –b –c trk_carving.conf –o output_folder image.dd 
 
Results: 
Data Device Archive Files name File browser fls Scalpel 
.gpx files Nüvi 1340 [44.gpx – 63.gpx] 22 23 26 
Nüvi 2515 {1.gpx} [7.gpx – 26.gpx] 21 22 26 
Nüvi 2595 [26.gpx – 45.gpx] 21 22 22 
Total 
waypoints 
Nüvi 1340 -- 11 11 19 
Nüvi 2515 -- 5 5 5 
Nüvi 2595 -- 7 7 7 
Total 
tracks 
Nüvi 1340 -- 1965 1965 1992 
Nüvi 2515 -- 232 232 294 
Nüvi 2595 -- 2107 2107 2192 
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Appendix I Anti-forensics #1 
Monday 14 July - 16:10 
Investigator: Alexandre Arbelet 
 
Anti-forensics study on a Garmin nüvi 2515LM. 
================================================= 
File considered: /root/2515.dd 
md5 : bfb891232e5f73706c9ab331a24b8b8c 
Original copy : /root/2515.orginal.dd 
md5 : bfb891232e5f73706c9ab331a24b8b8c 
================================================= 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 
d/d 22: GPX 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 22 
r/r 32113798: Current.gpx 
d/d 32113800: Archive 
r/r * 32113802: Position.gpx 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 32113800 
r/r 32139270: 61.gpx 
r/r 32139272: 62.gpx 
r/r 32139274: 63.gpx 
r/r 32139276: 44.gpx 
r/r 32139278: 45.gpx 
r/r 32139280: 46.gpx 
r/r 32139282: 47.gpx 
r/r 32139284: 48.gpx 
r/r 32139286: 49.gpx 
r/r 32139288: 50.gpx 
r/r 32139290: 51.gpx 
r/r 32139292: 52.gpx 
r/r 32139294: 53.gpx 
r/r 32139296: 54.gpx 
r/r 32139298: 55.gpx 
r/r 32139300: 56.gpx 
r/r 32139302: 57.gpx 
r/r 32139304: 58.gpx 
r/r 32139306: 59.gpx 
r/r 32139308: 60.gpx 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 32139308 
Directory Entry: 32139308 
Allocated 
File Attributes: File, Archive 
Size: 1104840 
Name: 60.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written: Wed Dec 4 08:07:06 2013 
Accessed: Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970 
Created: Thu Nov 28 19:38:18 2013 
 
Sectors: 
2070136 2070137 2070138 2070139 2070140 2070141 2070142 2070143... 
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$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=512 skip=2070137 count=1 | xxd 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
512 bytes (512 B) copied, 4.4699e-05 s, 11.5 MB/s 
0000000: 7369 6f6e 7376 332e 7873 6420 6874 7470 sionsv3.xsd http 
0000010: 3a2f 2f77 7777 2e67 6172 6d69 6e2e 636f ://www.garmin.co 
0000020: 6d2f 786d 6c73 6368 656d 6173 2f54 7261 m/xmlschemas/Tra 
0000030: 636b 506f 696e 7445 7874 656e 7369 6f6e ckPointExtension 
0000040: 2f76 3220 6874 7470 3a2f 2f77 7777 2e67 /v2 http://www.g 
0000050: 6172 6d69 6e2e 636f 6d2f 786d 6c73 6368 armin.com/xmlsch 
0000060: 656d 6173 2f54 7261 636b 506f 696e 7445 emas/TrackPointE 
0000070: 7874 656e 7369 6f6e 7632 2e78 7364 223e xtensionv2.xsd"> 
0000080: 3c6d 6574 6164 6174 613e 3c6c 696e 6b20 <metadata><link  
0000090: 6872 6566 3d22 6874 7470 3a2f 2f77 7777 href="http://www 
00000a0: 2e67 6172 6d69 6e2e 636f 6d22 3e3c 7465 .garmin.com"><te 
00000b0: 7874 3e47 6172 6d69 6e20 496e 7465 726e xt>Garmin Intern 
00000c0: 6174 696f 6e61 6c3c 2f74 6578 743e 3c2f ational</text></ 
00000d0: 6c69 6e6b 3e3c 7469 6d65 3e32 3031 332d link><time>2013- 
00000e0: 3131 2d32 3854 3139 3a33 383a 3139 5a3c 11-28T19:38:19Z< 
00000f0: 2f74 696d 653e 3c2f 6d65 7461 6461 7461 /time></metadata 
0000100: 3e3c 7472 6b3e 3c6e 616d 653e 4163 7469 ><trk><name>Acti 
0000110: 7665 204c 6f67 3a20 3230 204e 4f56 2032 ve Log: 20 NOV 2 
0000120: 3031 3320 3036 3a35 313c 2f6e 616d 653e 013 06:51</name> 
0000130: 3c74 726b 7365 673e 3c74 726b 7074 206c <trkseg><trkpt l 
0000140: 6174 3d22 3531 2e33 3834 3136 3422 206c at="51.384164" l 
0000150: 6f6e 3d22 2d30 2e32 3133 3039 3122 3e3c on="-0.213091">< 
0000160: 656c 653e 3238 2e30 323c 2f65 6c65 3e3c ele>28.02</ele>< 
0000170: 7469 6d65 3e32 3031 332d 3131 2d32 3054 time>2013-11-20T 
0000180: 3036 3a35 313a 3538 5a3c 2f74 696d 653e 06:51:58Z</time> 
0000190: 3c65 7874 656e 7369 6f6e 733e 3c67 7078 <extensions><gpx 
00001a0: 7470 783a 5472 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 4578 tpx:TrackPointEx 
00001b0: 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c67 7078 7470 783a tension><gpxtpx: 
00001c0: 636f 7572 7365 3e33 3030 2e37 313c 2f67 course>300.71</g 
00001d0: 7078 7470 783a 636f 7572 7365 3e3c 2f67 pxtpx:course></g 
00001e0: 7078 7470 783a 5472 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 pxtpx:TrackPoint 
00001f0: 4578 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c2f 6578 7465 Extension></exte 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=1 skip=1059910468 count=1| xxd 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
1 byte (1 B) copied, 4.9378e-05 s, 20.3 kB/s 
0000000: 35 5 
 
$echo -ne "\x34"| dd of=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN seek=1059910468  
bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
1 byte (1 B) copied, 0.000260159 s, 3.8 kB/s 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=1 skip=1059910468 count=1 | 
xxd 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
1 byte (1 B) copied, 7.1308e-05 s, 14.0 kB/s 
0000000: 34 4 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=512 skip=2070137 count=1 | xxd 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
512 bytes (512 B) copied, 5.0775e-05 s, 10.1 MB/s 
0000000: 7369 6f6e 7376 332e 7873 6420 6874 7470 sionsv3.xsd http 
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0000010: 3a2f 2f77 7777 2e67 6172 6d69 6e2e 636f ://www.garmin.co 
0000020: 6d2f 786d 6c73 6368 656d 6173 2f54 7261 m/xmlschemas/Tra 
0000030: 636b 506f 696e 7445 7874 656e 7369 6f6e ckPointExtension 
0000040: 2f76 3220 6874 7470 3a2f 2f77 7777 2e67 /v2 http://www.g 
0000050: 6172 6d69 6e2e 636f 6d2f 786d 6c73 6368 armin.com/xmlsch 
0000060: 656d 6173 2f54 7261 636b 506f 696e 7445 emas/TrackPointE 
0000070: 7874 656e 7369 6f6e 7632 2e78 7364 223e xtensionv2.xsd"> 
0000080: 3c6d 6574 6164 6174 613e 3c6c 696e 6b20 <metadata><link  
0000090: 6872 6566 3d22 6874 7470 3a2f 2f77 7777 href="http://www 
00000a0: 2e67 6172 6d69 6e2e 636f 6d22 3e3c 7465 .garmin.com"><te 
00000b0: 7874 3e47 6172 6d69 6e20 496e 7465 726e xt>Garmin Intern 
00000c0: 6174 696f 6e61 6c3c 2f74 6578 743e 3c2f ational</text></ 
00000d0: 6c69 6e6b 3e3c 7469 6d65 3e32 3031 332d link><time>2013- 
00000e0: 3131 2d32 3854 3139 3a33 383a 3139 5a3c 11-28T19:38:19Z< 
00000f0: 2f74 696d 653e 3c2f 6d65 7461 6461 7461 /time></metadata 
0000100: 3e3c 7472 6b3e 3c6e 616d 653e 4163 7469 ><trk><name>Acti 
0000110: 7665 204c 6f67 3a20 3230 204e 4f56 2032 ve Log: 20 NOV 2 
0000120: 3031 3320 3036 3a35 313c 2f6e 616d 653e 013 06:51</name> 
0000130: 3c74 726b 7365 673e 3c74 726b 7074 206c <trkseg><trkpt l 
0000140: 6174 3d22 3431 2e33 3834 3136 3422 206c at="41.384164" l 
0000150: 6f6e 3d22 2d30 2e32 3133 3039 3122 3e3c on="-0.213091">< 
0000160: 656c 653e 3238 2e30 323c 2f65 6c65 3e3c ele>28.02</ele>< 
0000170: 7469 6d65 3e32 3031 332d 3131 2d32 3054 time>2013-11-20T 
0000180: 3036 3a35 313a 3538 5a3c 2f74 696d 653e 06:51:58Z</time> 
0000190: 3c65 7874 656e 7369 6f6e 733e 3c67 7078 <extensions><gpx 
00001a0: 7470 783a 5472 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 4578 tpx:TrackPointEx 
00001b0: 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c67 7078 7470 783a tension><gpxtpx: 
00001c0: 636f 7572 7365 3e33 3030 2e37 313c 2f67 course>300.71</g 
00001d0: 7078 7470 783a 636f 7572 7365 3e3c 2f67 pxtpx:course></g 
00001e0: 7078 7470 783a 5472 6163 6b50 6f69 6e74 pxtpx:TrackPoint 
00001f0: 4578 7465 6e73 696f 6e3e 3c2f 6578 7465 Extension></exte 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 32139308 
Directory Entry: 32139308 
Allocated 
File Attributes: File, Archive 
Size: 1104840 
Name: 60.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written: Wed Dec 4 08:07:06 2013 
Accessed: Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970 
Created: Thu Nov 28 19:38:18 2013 
 
Sectors: 
2070136 2070137 2070138 2070139 2070140 2070141 2070142 2070143 
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Appendix J Anti-forensics #2 
Wednesday 23 July - 11:12 
Investigator: Alexandre Arbelet 
 
Anti-forensic experiment on a Garmin nüvi 2595LM. 
 
******************************************************* 
Aim: 
******************************************************* 
This experiment aims to show how data retrieved on GPS devices 
cannot be relied upon, due to the fact it could be easily 
manipulated. 
 
 
******************************************************* 
Device 
******************************************************* 
Model               : Garmin Nüvi 2595LM 
Image pre-experiment: 2014-07-23_2595LM.dd 
MD5 Sum             : af383947516f031393b667350476f94b 
 
 
******************************************************* 
Manipulation 
******************************************************* 
$fls 2014-07-23_2595LM.dd 
d/d 21:    GPX 
 
$fls 2014-07-23_2595LM.dd 21 
d/d 171155846:    Archive 
r/r * 171155848:    Position.gpx 
r/r 171155850:    Current.gpx 
 
$istat 2014-07-23_2595LM.dd 171155850 | head 
Directory Entry: 171155850 
Allocated 
File Attributes: File, Archive 
Size: 2221068 
Name: CURRENT.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written:    Wed Jul 23 12:03:10 2014 
Accessed:    Tue May 27 00:00:00 2014 
Created:    Sat Sep 28 10:36:32 2013 
 
$istat 2014-07-23_2595LM.dd 21 
Directory Entry: 21 
Allocated 
File Attributes: Directory 
Size: 4096 
Name: GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written:    Wed Jul 23 12:03:06 2014 
Accessed:    Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970 
Created:    Fri Jun 14 22:29:42 2013 
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Sectors: 
10711992 10711993 10711994 10711995 10711996 10711997 10711998 
10711999 
 
$dd if=2014-07-23_2595LM.dd bs=512 skip=10711992 count=1 | xxd 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
512 bytes (512 B) copied, 4.5466e-05 s, 11.3 MB/s 
0000000: 2e20 2020 2020 2020 2020 2010 0000 0000  .          ..... 
0000010: 0000 0000 1400 0000 0000 4567 0000 0000  ..........Eg.... 
0000020: 2e2e 2020 2020 2020 2020 2010 0000 0000  ..         ..... 
0000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000040: 4141 0072 0063 0068 0069 000f 0075 7600  AA.r.c.h.i...uv. 
0000050: 6500 0000 ffff ffff ffff 0000 ffff ffff  e............... 
0000060: 4152 4348 4956 4520 2020 2010 0000 b5b3  ARCHIVE    ..... 
0000070: ce42 0000 1400 ac45 f444 4667 0000 0000  .B.....E.DFg.... 
0000080: e550 006f 0073 0069 0074 000f 003c 6900  .P.o.s.i.t...<i. 
0000090: 6f00 6e00 2e00 6700 7000 0000 7800 0000  o.n...g.p...x... 
00000a0: e54f 5349 5449 4f4e 4750 5820 0000 6360  .OSITIONGPX ..c` 
00000b0: f744 0000 1400 6360 f744 1069 0103 0000  .D....c`.D.i.... 
00000c0: 4143 0075 0072 0072 0065 000f 00f2 6e00  AC.u.r.r.e....n. 
00000d0: 7400 2e00 6700 7000 7800 0000 0000 ffff  t...g.p.x....... 
00000e0: 4355 5252 454e 5420 4750 5820 0000 9054  CURRENT GPX ...T 
00000f0: 3c43 bb44 1400 6560 f744 1169 0ce4 2100  <C.D..e`.D.i..!. 
0000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000120: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000130: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000140: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000150: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000160: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000170: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000180: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000190: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
 
****************************************************************** 
Date calculation 
****************************************************************** 
Last modified timestamp: 6560 f744 
Offset                 : 0f6 0f7 0f8 0f9 
Last accessed timestamp: bb44 
Offset                 : 0f2 0f3 
 
** We want to keep the same time, but change the last accessed 
and  
last modified date to the 16 instead of the 21 ** 
 
date (little endian): f744 
date (big endian)   : 44f7 
date (big endian)   : 01000100 11110111 
 
 Year    Month  Day 
=======  ====  ===== 
0100010  0111  10111 
 2014      7     23 
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Day: 
10111 => 10000 
23    => 16 
 
new date (big endian)   : 01000100 11110000 
new date (big endian)   : 44f0 
new date (little endian): f044 
 
new last accessed tiemstamp: f044 
new last modified timestamp: 6560 f044 
 
Offsets to modify: 0f2 -- bb -> f0 
           0f8 -- f7 -> f0 
 
 
****************************************************************** 
Modification on the device 
****************************************************************** 
** Connection to the computer with an usb cable. 
 
$fls /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN  
d/d 21:    GPX 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 21 
Directory Entry: 21 
Allocated 
File Attributes: Directory 
Size: 4096 
Name: GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written:    Wed Jul 23 12:03:06 2014 
Accessed:    Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970 
Created:    Fri Jun 14 22:29:42 2013 
 
Sectors: 
10711992 10711993 10711994 10711995 10711996 10711997 10711998 
10711999 
 
$bc 
**10711992 * 512 = 5484539904 
**5484539904 + 0xf2 (242) = 5484540146 
**5484539904 + 0xf8 (248) = 5484540152 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=1 skip=5484540146 count=2| xxd 
2+0 records in 
2+0 records out 
2 bytes (2 B) copied, 9.219e-05 s, 21.7 kB/s 
0000000: bb44                                     .D 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=1 skip=5484540152 count=2| xxd 
2+0 records in 
2+0 records out 
2 bytes (2 B) copied, 0.000126482 s, 15.8 kB/s 
0000000: f744                                     .D 
 
$echo -ne "\xf0" | dd of=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN seek=5484540146 
bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
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1 byte (1 B) copied, 8.9676e-05 s, 11.2 kB/s 
 
$echo -ne "\xf0" | dd of=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN seek=5484540152 
bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc 
1+0 records in 
1+0 records out 
1 byte (1 B) copied, 8.6743e-05 s, 11.5 kB/s 
 
$dd if=/dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN bs=1 skip=5484539904 count=512 | 
xxd 
0000000: 2e20 2020 2020 2020 2020 2010 0000 0000  .          ..... 
0000010: 0000 0000 1400 0000 0000 4567 0000 0000  ..........Eg.... 
0000020: 2e2e 2020 2020 2020 2020 2010 0000 0000  ..         ..... 
0000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000040: 4141 0072 0063 0068 0069 000f 0075 7600  AA.r.c.h.i...uv. 
0000050: 6500 0000 ffff ffff ffff 0000 ffff ffff  e............... 
0000060: 4152 4348 4956 4520 2020 2010 0000 b5b3  ARCHIVE    ..... 
0000070: ce42 0000 1400 ac45 f444 4667 0000 0000  .B.....E.DFg.... 
0000080: e550 006f 0073 0069 0074 000f 003c 6900  .P.o.s.i.t...<i. 
0000090: 6f00 6e00 2e00 6700 7000 0000 7800 0000  o.n...g.p...x... 
00000a0: e54f 5349 5449 4f4e 4750 5820 0000 6360  .OSITIONGPX ..c` 
00000b0: f744 0000 1400 6360 f744 1069 0103 0000  .D....c`.D.i.... 
00000c0: 4143 0075 0072 0072 0065 000f 00f2 6e00  AC.u.r.r.e....n. 
00000d0: 7400 2e00 6700 7000 7800 0000 0000 ffff  t...g.p.x....... 
00000e0: 4355 5252 454e 5420 4750 5820 0000 9054  CURRENT GPX ...T 
00000f0: 3c43 f044 1400 6560 f044 1169 0ce4 2100  <C.D..e`.D.i..!. 
0000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000120: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000130: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000140: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000150: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000160: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000170: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000180: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
0000190: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
00001f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000  ................ 
 
$istat /dev/disk/by-label/GARMIN 171155850 | head 
Directory Entry: 171155850 
Allocated 
File Attributes: File, Archive 
Size: 2221068 
Name: CURRENT.GPX 
 
Directory Entry Times: 
Written:    Wed Jul 16 12:03:10 2014 
Accessed:    Wed Jul 16 00:00:00 2014 
Created:    Sat Sep 28 10:36:32 2013 
 
